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DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTION ATTACKING THE PROCEDURE USED TO ENACT LEGISLATION IS SUBJECT TO THE FOUR-MONTH ARTICLE 78 STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTION CHALLENGING THE LEGISLATION ITSELF IS SUBJECT TO THE SIX-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, in a lawsuit brought by plaintiff village alleging the county did not have the power to issue parking tickets in the village, explained how to determine the appropriate statute of limitations in actions seeking a declaratory judgment:

While no period of limitation is specifically prescribed for a declaratory judgment action, the six-year catch-all limitation period of CPLR 213(1) does not necessarily apply to all such actions. Rather, in order to determine the statute of limitations applicable to an action for a declaratory judgment, a court must examine the substance of the action. Where it is determined that the parties’ dispute can be, or could have been, resolved in an action or proceeding for which a specific limitation period is statutorily required, that limitation period governs … .

A proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 is unavailable to challenge the validity of a legislative act … . However, when a challenge is directed to the procedure followed in enacting, rather than the substance of, legislation, a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 may be maintained … . …

… [T]he plaintiff’s third cause of action alleged that the actions taken by the defendants in the formation of the agency were void, invalid, and illegal due to the failure of the defendants to comply with the requirements of the State Environmental Quality Review Act … . “SEQRA challenges must be commenced within four months after the determination becomes final and binding upon the petitioner … .

… [T]he plaintiff’s … causes of action … for declaratory relief … challenging the substantive validity of the defendants’ formation of the [county parking ticket] agency and the defendants’ continuing actions with respect to the adjudication of tickets issued for violations occurring in the Village, either could not have been maintained in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 … , or related to ongoing actions of the defendants, and, thus, were not barred by the four-month limitation period under CPLR 217(1). Accordingly, since the six-year statute of limitations of CPLR 213(1) applies … .  Village of Islandia v County of Suffolk, 2018 NY Slip Op 04025, Second Dept 6-6-18

​CIVIL PROCEDURE (DECLARATORY JUDGMENT, DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTION ATTACKING THE PROCEDURE USED TO ENACT LEGISLATION IS SUBJECT TO THE FOUR-MONTH ARTICLE 78 STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTION CHALLENGING THE LEGISLATION ITSELF IS SUBJECT TO THE SIX-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS (SECOND DEPT))/STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS (DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTION ATTACKING THE PROCEDURE USED TO ENACT LEGISLATION IS SUBJECT TO THE FOUR-MONTH ARTICLE 78 STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTION CHALLENGING THE LEGISLATION ITSELF IS SUBJECT TO THE SIX-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS (SECOND DEPT))/DECLARATORY JUDGMENT (STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTION ATTACKING THE PROCEDURE USED TO ENACT LEGISLATION IS SUBJECT TO THE FOUR-MONTH ARTICLE 78 STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTION CHALLENGING THE LEGISLATION ITSELF IS SUBJECT TO THE SIX-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS (SECOND DEPT))/MUNICIPAL LAW  (DECLARATORY JUDGMENT, DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTION ATTACKING THE PROCEDURE USED TO ENACT LEGISLATION IS SUBJECT TO THE FOUR-MONTH ARTICLE 78 STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTION CHALLENGING THE LEGISLATION ITSELF IS SUBJECT TO THE SIX-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS (SECOND DEPT))

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BECAUSE MOTHER’S ATTORNEY APPEARED MOTHER WAS NOT IN DEFAULT; FAMILY COURT’S REFUSAL TO ADMIT DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE OFFERED BY MOTHER’S ATTORNEY DEPRIVED MOTHER OF DUE PROCESS (SECOND DEPT).
DEFENDANT ALLEGED HE WAS NOT SERVED WITH THE SUMMONS AND COMPLAINT WITHIN 120 DAYS OF FILING AND PLAINTIFF DID NOT FILE AN AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE WITH THE CLERK, DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION PROPERLY GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER FRONTMOST DRIVER NEGLIGENTLY BROUGHT HER CAR TO A COMPLETE STOP IN THIS REAR-END COLLISION CASE, FRONTMOST DRIVER’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
A DIAGNOSIS OF UNSPECIFIED PARAPHILIC DISORDER IS NOT ACCEPTED IN THE PSYCHIATRIC OR PSYCHOLOGICAL COMMUNITIES, EXPERT EVIDENCE ABOUT THE DISORDER SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMITTED IN THIS SEX OFFENDER CIVIL COMMITMENT TRIAL (SECOND DEPT).
THE CONVICTION WAS AFFIRMED BUT A STRONG TWO-JUSTICE DISSENT ARGUED EXCESSIVE INTERVENTION BY THE JUDGE DEPRIVED DEFENDANT OF A FAIR TRIAL (SECOND DEPT).
ALTHOUGH THE INSURER DID NOT RECEIVE NOTICE OF THE CLAIM UNTIL 23 MONTHS AFTER THE CAR ACCIDENT, IT WAS NOT PREJUDICED BY THE DELAY AND DID NOT COMMENCE A TIMELY INVESTIGATION OF THE CLAIM; THE DISCLAIMER OF COVERAGE WAS INVALID (SECOND DEPT).
THE BOUNDARY BETWEEN PLAINTIFFS’ AND DEFENDANTS’ PROPERTIES RUNS THROUGH A DRIVEWAY, 10 FEET ON DEFENDANTS’ PROPERTY AND SEVEN FEET ON PLAINTIFFS’ PROPERTY; DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT DECLARING PLAINTIFFS DID NOT HAVE A PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT OVER THE DRIVEWAY SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

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