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PLAINTIFF’S PRO SE LEGAL MALPRACTICE COMPLAINT WAS PROPERLY DISMISSED AND LIMITS ON PLAINTIFF’S ABILITY TO ENGAGE IN FUTURE VEXATIOUS LITIGATION PROPERLY IMPOSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined Supreme Court properly dismissed plaintiff’s pro se legal malpractice action and properly limited plaintiff’s ability to file additional motions:

“Public policy generally mandates free access to the courts” … . Although a pro se litigant is afforded ” some latitude,'” he or she is not entitled to rights greater than any other litigant and may not disregard court rules or deprive an adversary of rights normally enjoyed by an opposing party … . Accordingly, “when a litigant is abusing the judicial process by harassing individuals solely out of ill will or spite, equity may enjoin such vexatious litigation” … . Here, the plaintiff’s pattern of vexatious and duplicative motion practice warranted the modest limitation of directing the plaintiff to bring future motions via order to show cause … . Strujan v Kaufman & Kahn, LLP, 2019 NY Slip Op 00630, Second Dept 1-30-19

 

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