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MEASUREMENT OF THE SIX-MONTH GRACE PERIOD FOR THE FILING OF A NEW ACTION AFTER DISMISSAL (WHICH WOULD OTHERWISE BE TIME-BARRED) PURSUANT TO CPLR 205(A) AND CPLR 205-A CLARIFIED IN AN OPINION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Dillon, clarified how the six-month grace period for filing a new action after dismissal (CPLR 205(a) and 205-a) is measured:

This appeal provides our Court with an occasion to resolve some inconsistencies in decisional authority regarding the timing of the termination event from which the six-month grace period under CPLR 205(a) and 205-a are measured. Under certain circumstances, both statutes permit the plaintiff a six-month window to recommence an action that otherwise would be untimely, measured from the “termination” of a prior action. Is the termination of the prior action the date an order of dismissal is executed by the court, the date the order of dismissal is entered with the clerk, or the date that the order of dismissal is served upon other parties with notice of entry? Is the termination of the prior action delayed 30 days for the potential filing of a notice of appeal pursuant to CPLR 5513(a) or a motion for leave to reargue pursuant to CPLR 2221(d), and further delayed by the appellate process when an actual appeal is undertaken, or is there no termination of the prior action until a final judgment is entered or served with notice of entry? The answer to these questions may make a crucial mathematical difference to the timeliness or untimeliness of actions commenced within or without the six-month grace periods under CPLR 205-a and 205(a). We conclude, for reasons stated below, that when no appeal is taken by a party from an order of dismissal, the six-month period for recommencing an action under CPLR 205-a, and by extension under CPLR 205(a), begins to run once 30 days have elapsed following service of the order of dismissal with notice of entry. HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v Hillaire, 2026 NY Slip Op 00353, Second Dept 1-28-26

Practice Point: Consult this opinion for a definitive discussion of how the six-month grace periods for the filing of a new otherwise time-barred action after dismissal pursuant to CPLR 205(a) and 205-a are measured.​

 

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