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30-DAY TIME TO APPEAL WITH RESPECT TO ALL PARTIES IS TRIGGERED BY THE SERVICE OF THE ORDER OR JUDGMENT WITH WRITTEN NOTICE OF ENTRY BY ANY PARTY (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Dillon, determined that the 30-day period for filing a notice of appeal (CPLR 5513(a)) is triggered for all parties when any party serves the other parties with the order or judgment appealed from with written notice of entry:

This appeal provides our Court with an occasion to clarify the meaning of CPLR 5513(a). The 1996 amendment to CPLR 5513(a), effective January 1, 1997, requires that an order or judgment be served “by a party” with written notice of entry in order to commence the time to undertake an appeal (L 1996, ch 214, § 1). … [W]e hold that service of the order or judgment with written notice of entry by any party upon the other parties to the action operates to commence the 30-day time to appeal with respect to not only the serving party, but all the parties in the action. * * *​

… [T]he language of CPLR 5513(a) as to who serves notice of entry is not limited to the “prevailing party,” or to “the appealing party,” or to “the party seeking to limit an adversary’s appellate time.” Rather, “a” party, which is unrestricted, necessarily refers to “any” party to an action. As a result, the service of an order or judgment with written notice of entry commences the 30-day time to appeal as to not only the party performing the service, but as to all other parties as well.

Here, the County’s [defendant’s] service on June 17, 2015, of the Supreme Court’s order with written notice of entry commenced the plaintiffs’ time to appeal the order as to all of the defendants, including those who served a notice of entry at a later date, and those who may have served no notice of entry at all. The plaintiffs’ appeal must therefore be dismissed as untimely as to all of the defendants (see CPLR 5513[a]). W. Rogowski Farm, LLC v County of Orange, 2019 NY Slip Op 01815, Second Dept 3-13-19

 

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