New York Appellate Digest
  • Home
  • About
  • Just Released
  • Update Service
  • Streamlined Research
  • CLE Courses
  • Contact
  • Menu Menu
You are here: Home1 / Attorneys2 / THE PROSECUTOR’S FAILURE TO INSTRUCT THE GRAND JURY ON THE JUSTIFICATION...
Attorneys, Criminal Law, Evidence

THE PROSECUTOR’S FAILURE TO INSTRUCT THE GRAND JURY ON THE JUSTIFICATION DEFENSE REQUIRED REVERSAL AFTER TRIAL AND DISMISSAL OF THE INDICTMENT (WITHOUT PREJUDICE) (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing defendant’s conviction and dismissing the indictment (without prejudice), determined the prosecutor erroneously failed to explain the justification defense to the grand jury. Although defendant had a knife, there was evidence the victim had a gun and was the initial aggressor:

If the District Attorney fails to instruct the grand jury on a defense that would eliminate a needless or unfounded prosecution, the proceeding is defective, mandating dismissal of the indictment (see id. § 210.35[5] …). “‘[A] prosecutor should instruct the [g]rand [j]ury on any complete defense supported by the evidence which has the potential for eliminating a needless or unfounded prosecution'” … . “Where the evidence before the grand jury supports it, the charge on justification must be given” … .

“In determining whether the evidence supports a justification defense, the record must be viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant” … . Here, a surveillance video shown to the grand jury indicated that the defendant approached Graves inside a store while holding a knife. Nevertheless, when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant, there is a reasonable view of the evidence that the defendant was not the initial aggressor, Graves pointed a gun at the defendant, the defendant stabbed Graves to defend himself from the imminent use of deadly physical force against him, and the defendant could not safely retreat (see Penal Law § 35.15[2][a] …). People v Mead, 2025 NY Slip Op 07412, Second Dept 12-31-25

Practice Point: Where the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant satisfies the criteria for a defense to the offense, the prosecutor must so instruct the grand jury. Failure to do so renders the grand jury proceeding defective and the indictment must be dismissed, even after a conviction at trial.

 

December 31, 2025
Tags: Second Department
Share this entry
  • Share on WhatsApp
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2025-12-31 15:23:252026-01-03 15:38:35THE PROSECUTOR’S FAILURE TO INSTRUCT THE GRAND JURY ON THE JUSTIFICATION DEFENSE REQUIRED REVERSAL AFTER TRIAL AND DISMISSAL OF THE INDICTMENT (WITHOUT PREJUDICE) (SECOND DEPT).
You might also like
A TREE FELL ON THE CAR IN WHICH PLAINTIFF WAS A PASSENGER, TOWN’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, TOWN DID NOT DEMONSTRATE IT HAD INSPECTED THE TREE AND DID NOT DEMONSTRATE A LACK OF NOTICE OF THE CONDITION OF THE TREE (SECOND DEPT).
14-YEAR-OLD PLAYING CATCH ON A SCHOOL ATHLETIC FIELD ASSUMED THE RISK OF INJURY FROM A TWO TO FIVE INCH DEPRESSION IN THE FIELD (SECOND DEPT).
DEFENDANT WAS DEPRIVED OF HIS RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL WHEN DEFENSE COUNSEL ARGUED DEFENDANT’S PRO SE MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE VERDICT WAS NOT VIABLE (SECOND DEPT). ​
THE PETITION TO STAY ARBITRATION PENDING A FRAMED ISSUE HEARING SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED IN THIS UNINSURED MOTORIST TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE; PROCEDURAL CRITERIA EXPLAINED (SECOND DEPT).
THE ELECTRICAL-CONTRACTOR CORP WAS NOT LICENSED TO DO ELECTRICAL WORK IN NYC; THE FACT THAT THE CORPORATION’S VICE PRESIDENT WAS LICENSED AND THE VICE PRESIDENT’S COMPANY, WHICH DID THE ELECTRICAL WORK AS A SUBCONTRACTOR, WAS LICENSED DOESN’T MATTER; THE CORPORATION CAN NOT SUE FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT (SECOND DEPT). ​
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE SUBMITTED IN SUPPORT OF THE MOTION TO DISMISS DID NOT MEET THE CRITERIA REQUIRED BY CPLR 3211(a)(1) (SECOND DEPT).
PLAINTIFF PASSENGER’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS REAR-END COLLISION CASE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, DEFENDANT RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT ABOUT THE LEAD DRIVER’S COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE 2ND DEPT.
SUPREME COURT PROPERLY GRANTED DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE VERDICT IN THIS PERSONAL INJURY ACTION UNLESS PLAINTIFF STIPULATED TO A SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTION IN DAMAGES FOR PAST AND FUTURE PAIN AND SUFFERING (SECOND DEPT).

Categories

  • Abuse of Process
  • Account Stated
  • Accountant Malpractice
  • Administrative Law
  • Agency
  • Animal Law
  • Appeals
  • Arbitration
  • Architectural Malpractice
  • Associations
  • Attorneys
  • Banking Law
  • Bankruptcy
  • Battery
  • Chiropractor Malpractice
  • Civil Commitment
  • Civil Conspiracy
  • Civil Forfeiture
  • Civil Procedure
  • Civil Rights Law
  • Condominium Corporations
  • Condominiums
  • Constitutional Law
  • Consumer Law
  • Contempt
  • Contract Law
  • Conversion
  • Cooperatives
  • Copyright
  • Corporation Law
  • Correction Law
  • County Law
  • Court of Claims
  • Criminal Law
  • Debtor-Creditor
  • Defamation
  • Dental Malpractice
  • Disciplinary Hearings (Inmates)
  • Education-School Law
  • Election Law
  • Eminent Domain
  • Employment Law
  • Engineering Malpractice
  • Environmental Law
  • Equitable Recoupment
  • Evidence
  • Fair Credit Reporting Act
  • Fair Housing Act
  • Fair Housing Amendments Act
  • False Arrest
  • False Claims Act
  • False Imprisonment
  • Family Law
  • Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA)
  • Fiduciary Duty
  • Forcible Touching
  • Foreclosure
  • Fraud
  • Freedom of Information Law (FOIL)
  • Human Rights Law
  • Immigration Law
  • Immunity
  • Indian Law
  • Insurance Law
  • Intellectual Property
  • Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
  • Involuntary Medical Treatment and Feeding (Inmates)
  • Judges
  • Judiciary Law
  • Labor Law
  • Labor Law-Construction Law
  • Land Use
  • Landlord-Tenant
  • Legal Malpractice
  • Lien Law
  • Limited Liability Company Law
  • Longshoreman's and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act
  • Malicious Prosecution
  • Maritime Law
  • Medicaid
  • Medical Malpractice
  • Mental Hygiene Law
  • Military Law
  • Money Had and Received
  • Municipal Law
  • Navigation Law
  • Negligence
  • Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
  • Negligent Misrepresentation
  • Notarial Misconduct
  • Nuisance
  • Partnership Law
  • Personal Property
  • Pharmacist Malpractice
  • Physician Patient Confidentiality
  • Pistol Permits
  • Prima Facie Tort
  • Private Nuisance
  • Privilege
  • Products Liability
  • Professional Malpractice
  • Public Authorities Law
  • Public Corporations
  • Public Health Law
  • Public Nuisance
  • Real Estate
  • Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL)
  • Real Property Law
  • Real Property Tax Law
  • Religion
  • Replevin
  • Retirement and Social Security Law
  • Securities
  • Sepulcher
  • Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA)
  • Social Services Law
  • Statutes
  • Tax Law
  • Tenant Harassment
  • Tortious Interference with Contract
  • Tortious Interference with Employment
  • Tortious Interference with Prospective Business Relations
  • Tortious Interference With Prospective Economic Advantage
  • Town Law
  • Toxic Torts
  • Trade Secrets
  • Trademarks
  • Trespass
  • Trespass to Chattels
  • Trusts and Estates
  • Uncategorized
  • Unemployment Insurance
  • Unfair Competition
  • Uniform Commercial Code
  • Usury
  • Utilities
  • Vehicle and Traffic Law
  • Victims of Gender-Motivated Violence Protection Law (VGM)
  • Village Law
  • Water Law
  • Workers' Compensation
  • Zoning

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

THE JUDGE’S RESTRICTIONS ON THE TESTIMONY OF THE DEFENSE “FALSE... THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE DEFENDANT USED DRUGS TO EXCESS AT THE TIME OF THE OFFENSE...
Scroll to top