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EXCESSIVE INTERFERENCE BY THE TRIAL JUDGE DEPRIVED DEFENDANT OF A FAIR TRIAL; ISSUE CONSIDERED ON APPEAL IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing defendant’s conviction, determined the judge’s intervention usurped the roles of the attorneys and deprived defendant of a fair trial. Defense counsel did not object but the issue was considered on appeal in the interest of justice:

“[W]hile a trial judge may intervene in a trial to clarify confusing testimony and facilitate the orderly and expeditious progress of the trial, the court may not take on the function or appearance of an advocate'” … . “The principle restraining the court’s discretion is that a trial judge’s function is to protect the record, not to make it'”… . Hence, “when the trial judge interjects often and indulges in an extended questioning of witnesses, even where those questions would be proper if they came from trial counsel, the trial judge’s participation presents significant risks of prejudicial unfairness” … .

In this case, the Supreme Court engaged in extensive questioning of witnesses, usurped the roles of the attorneys, elicited and assisted in developing facts damaging to the defense on direct examination of the People’s witnesses, bolstered the witnesses’ credibility, interrupted cross-examination, and generally created the impression that it was an advocate on behalf of the People. People v Ramsey, 2019 NY Slip Op 05571, Second Dept 7-10-19

 

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