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BANK WAS UNABLE TO DEMONSTRATE STANDING AND FAILED TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE BUSINESS RECORDS EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE, BANK’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff bank did not demonstrate it had standing to foreclose. Therefore the bank’s motion for summary judgment should not have been granted. Among other failings, the requirements of the business records exception to the hearsay rule were not met:

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Here, the plaintiff produced the mortgage, the unpaid note, and evidence of the appellant’s default. However, the plaintiff failed, prima facie, to establish its standing. Where, as here, the note has been endorsed in blank, the purported holder of the note must establish its standing by demonstrating that the original note was physically delivered to it prior to the commencement of the action … . The plaintiff attempted to establish its standing through the affidavit of Myron D. Keyes, Vice President Loan Documentation of Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (hereinafter Wells Fargo), the servicing agent to the plaintiff. However, Keyes averred only that the plaintiff was “in possession of” the note. The plaintiff subsequently submitted a further affidavit from April J. Linn, another Vice President Loan Documentation of Wells Fargo. Unlike Keyes, Linn submitted documentary evidence showing that Wells Fargo was appointed the plaintiff’s servicing agent on February 21, 2014. Linn further averred, based on her familiarity with the business records maintained by Wells Fargo, that the plaintiff “had possession of the [note] as of November 28, 2006.” However, Linn’s affidavit failed, among other things, to explain how a review of the business records of a servicing agent appointed in 2014 could prove that the plaintiff had obtained physical possession of the note more than seven years earlier. In sum, Keyes’ affidavit, as well as Linn’s subsequent affidavit, provided neither sufficient factual details to establish the physical delivery of the note to the plaintiff prior to the commencement of this action … , nor the foundational knowledge required to admit such factual details under the business records exception to the hearsay rule … . U.S. Bank N.A. v Brody, 2017 NY Slip Op 08873, Second Dept 12-20-17

FORECLOSURE (STANDING, EVIDENCE, BANK WAS UNABLE TO DEMONSTRATE STANDING AND FAILED TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE BUSINESS RECORDS EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE, BANK’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/EVIDENCE (FORECLOSURE, STANDING, BANK WAS UNABLE TO DEMONSTRATE STANDING AND FAILED TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE BUSINESS RECORDS EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE, BANK’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/STANDING (FORECLOSURE, BANK WAS UNABLE TO DEMONSTRATE STANDING AND FAILED TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE BUSINESS RECORDS EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE, BANK’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/HEARSAY (FORECLOSURE, BUSINESS RECORDS EXCEPTION,  BANK WAS UNABLE TO DEMONSTRATE STANDING AND FAILED TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE BUSINESS RECORDS EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE, BANK’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/BUSINESS RECORDS (HEARSAY EXCEPTION, FORECLOSURE, BANK WAS UNABLE TO DEMONSTRATE STANDING AND FAILED TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE BUSINESS RECORDS EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE, BANK’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))

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