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QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER DEFENDANT POLICE OFFICER ACTED WITH “RECKLESS DISREGARD” FOR THE SAFETY OF OTHERS DURING A POLICE CHASE PRECLUDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT; PLAINTIFF POLICE OFFICER WAS INJURED WHEN HER PATROL CAR WAS STRUCK BY THE PURSUED CAR (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined there were questions of fact whether defendant police officer, Encarnation, acted with “reckless disregard” during a police chase. The pursued car crashed into plaintiff police officer’s, Corsi’s, patrol car. Defendant Encarnation worked for the Village of Ossining police department. Plaintiff Corsi worked for the Village of Briarcliff Manor police department. Plaintiff sued both Encarnation and the Village of Ossining:

The plaintiff commenced the instant action against, among others, the Village of Ossining and Encarnacion pursuant to General Municipal Law § 207-c(6) for the reimbursement of all salary, benefits, and expenses paid by the plaintiff to Corsi as a result of injuries she sustained in the line of duty due to the allegedly reckless or negligent conduct of the Village of Ossining and Encarnacion that took place during Encarnacion’s pursuit of Hester and Hester’s eventual crash into Corsi’s vehicle. * * *

… [T]he Village of Ossining and Encarnacion failed to eliminate all triable issues of fact as to whether Encarnacion acted with reckless disregard for the safety of others and whether such conduct was a proximate cause of Corsi’s injuries … . In support of their motion, the Village of Ossining and Encarnacion submitted, among other things, transcripts of the deposition testimony of Encarnacion, Hester, and Corsi, who collectively testified that on the day at issue, Encarnacion pursued Hester at high speeds through residential and commercial roads and that Hester struck another vehicle and narrowly avoided striking pedestrians during the chase. Village of Briarcliff Manor v Village of Ossining, 2025 NY Slip Op 06214, Second Dept 11-12-25

Practice Point: Consult this decision for insight into the evidence which will raise a question of fact whether a police officer, during an emergency car-chase, acted with “reckless disregard” for the safety of others such that a police officer injured when the pursued car crashed into her patrol car can sue pursuant to General Municipal Law 207-c (6).

 

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