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BROKER NOT ENTITLED TO COMMISSION, MOTION TO SET ASIDE PLAINTIFF’S VERDICT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED.

The Second Department determined the motion to set aside the jury verdict finding plaintiff was entitled to a broker’s commission for the sale of defendant’s property should have been granted. The court explained the relevant criteria:

 

To prevail on a cause of action to recover a commission, the broker must establish (1) that it is duly licensed, (2) that it had a contract, express or implied, with the party to be charged with paying the commission, and (3) that it was the procuring cause of the sale … . “[T]he duty assumed by the broker is to bring the minds of the buyer and seller to an agreement for a sale, and the price and terms on which it is to be made, and until that is done his right to commissions does not accrue” … . To establish that a broker was the procuring cause of a transaction, the broker must establish that there was “a direct and proximate link, as distinguished from one that is indirect and remote, between the bare introduction and the consummation” … . Where, as here, the broker is not involved in the negotiations leading up to the completion of the deal, the broker must establish that it ” created an amicable atmosphere in which negotiations proceeded or that [it] generated a chain of circumstances that proximately led to the sale'” … . * * *

Here, there was no valid line of reasoning which could have led to the conclusion that the plaintiff was the procuring cause of the sale.  Douglas Elliman, LLC v Silver, 2016 NY Slip Op 00675, 2nd Dept 2-3-16

 

REAL ESTATE (BROKER NOT ENTITLED TO COMMISSION)/BROKERS, REAL ESTATE (NOT ENTITLED TO COMMISSION)/COMMISSIONS, REAL ESTATE (BROKER NOT ENTITLED TO COMMISSION)

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