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You are here: Home1 / Constitutional Law2 / THE DEFENDANT SAID “HE DIDN’T WANT TO TALK ABOUT THAT …”...
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Evidence

THE DEFENDANT SAID “HE DIDN’T WANT TO TALK ABOUT THAT …” AND THE POLICE STOPPED QUESTIONING HIM; AN HOUR AN A HALF LATER THE POLICE RESUMED QUESTIONING WITHOUT RE-READING THE MIRANDA RIGHTS; THOSE STATEMENTS SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED; NEW TRIAL ORDERED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing defendant’s conviction and ordering a new trial, determined the statements made by defendant after he invoked his right to remain silent should have suppressed. The questioning stopped after defendant said “he didn’t want to talk about that …”. The questioning resumed an hour and a half later without a re-reading of defendant’s Miranda rights:

… [A]fter the police told defendant that they considered him a suspect in the underlying shooting and asked him “for his side of the story,” defendant continually stated that “he didn’t want to talk about that and [that] he’d rather take his chances.” We conclude that defendant thereby unequivocally invoked his right to remain silent … inasmuch as “[n]o reasonable police officer could have interpreted that statement as anything other than a desire not to talk to the police” … . Indeed, the actions of the police in response to defendant’s statement demonstrated that they understood his statement to be an unequivocal invocation of his right to remain silent—i.e., they promptly ceased their questioning of defendant and left the interrogation room for a prolonged period of time … . Defendant’s responses to a police officer when the officer resumed the interrogation—which occurred about an hour and a half after the prior questioning ceased—did not negate defendant’s prior unequivocal invocation of his right to remain silent because the police officer failed to reread the Miranda warnings to defendant before resuming the interrogation and therefore failed to scrupulously honor his right to remain silent … . People v Surles, 2025 NY Slip Op 05603, Fourth Dept 10-10-25

Practice Point: Here the police stopped questioning defendant when he said “he didn’t want to talk about that …”. An hour and half later the police resumed questioning without re-reading the Miranda rights. Those statement should have been suppressed.

 

October 10, 2025
Tags: Fourth Department
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https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2025-10-10 18:36:122025-10-11 19:41:21THE DEFENDANT SAID “HE DIDN’T WANT TO TALK ABOUT THAT …” AND THE POLICE STOPPED QUESTIONING HIM; AN HOUR AN A HALF LATER THE POLICE RESUMED QUESTIONING WITHOUT RE-READING THE MIRANDA RIGHTS; THOSE STATEMENTS SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED; NEW TRIAL ORDERED (FOURTH DEPT).
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