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THE CONFLICTING EXPERT REPORTS AND OTHER EVIDENCE RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CAUSED SERIOUS INJURY DESPITE PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT’S PREEXISTING CONDITIONS (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Michael, determined Supreme Court properly denied summary judgment on the question whether plaintiff’s decedent, Kenneth Moore, suffered “serious injury” within the meaning of Insurance Law 5102(d) in a traffic accident. The conflicting expert evidence raised questions of fact about whether the accident exacerbated preexisting conditions, including arthritis

… [A] preexisting condition does not foreclose a finding that the plaintiff’s injuries were causally related to the subject accident … . Where a defendant meets its prima facie burden in establishing that the preexisting condition is the cause of the plaintiff’s injuries, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to present evidence addressing causation … .

To meet his burden, the plaintiff must address the evidence of preexisting conditions “and explain why [his] current reported symptoms [are] not related to the preexisting conditions” or how the accident aggravated his underlying degenerative conditions … . * * *

… [P]laintiff’s evidence, including conflicting expert reports; testimony as to Moore’s increased pain and diminished physical capabilities; and medical records showing a new course of treatment, new diagnoses, and aggravated injuries, raised issues of fact as to whether Moore’s worsened physical condition was causally related to the accident … . Moore v Maley, 2025 NY Slip Op 05304, First Dept 10-2-25

Practice Point: Consult this opinion for an an explanation of how to deal with a plaintiff’s preexisting conditions when assessing whether plaintiff has suffered “serious injury” in a traffic accident within the meaning of the Insurance Law.

 

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Under the Circumstances, Court Properly Considered New Information Presented in a Surreply

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