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ALTHOUGH DEFENDANT DEMONSTRATED THE POST ON LINKEDIN MET THE CRITERIA FOR THE “STRATEGIC LAWSUIT AGAINST PUBLIC PARTICIPATION” (SLAPP) DEFENSE TO THE DEFAMATION ACTION, PLAINTIFFS DEMONSTRATED THE DEFAMATION ACTION HAS A “SUBSTANTIAL BASIS IN LAW;” THEREFORE THE ACTION SURVIVED THE MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO CIVIL RIGHTS LAW 76-A (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department determined plaintiffs had stated causes of action for defamation requiring the denial of defendant’s motion to dismiss the action as a strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP, Civil Rights Law section 76-a). Plaintiffs alleged defendant put up a post on Linkedin in which defendant held himself out as a “Nonprofit Leader and Consultant” and referred to a person readily identified as plaintiff Stiloski. The post stated that “[a] Tarrytown extremist who supports neo-Nazi causes and does a ton of business with the Village placed a massive sign on his place showing a graphic middle finger aimed at our Black community:”

… [T]he plaintiffs established that the causes of action alleging defamation and defamation per se had substantial bases in the law. The defendant’s statements in the LinkedIn post, under the circumstances and in the context made, did not constitute nonactionable pure opinion … . The defendant did not call Stiloski a “neo-Nazi,” which arguably can be pure opinion. Rather, the nuanced statements at issue in the LinkedIn post, namely that Stiloski was a “Tarrytown extremist who supports neo-Nazi causes”… , can “readily be proven true or false” and, under these circumstances, in which the defendant held himself out to be a “Nonprofit Leader and Consultant” and the amended complaint alleged that the defendant is a well-known community activist, “signaled to the average reader or listener that the defendant was conveying facts about the plaintiff” … . Alternatively, the statements in the LinkedIn post are those of mixed opinion and, therefore, actionable, as “a reasonable reader would have inferred that the poster had knowledge of facts, unknown to the audience, supporting the assertions made” … . The plaintiffs further sufficiently alleged in the amended complaint that the statements made in the LinkedIn post were detrimental to them. Specifically, the amended complaint alleged that in July 2022, a potential customer refused the plaintiffs’ services and called Stiloski a “racist” and a “white supremacist.” Additionally, the plaintiffs alleged that the automotive business suffered as a result of the defendant’s actions, notably that a local church ceased doing business with the plaintiffs, among [*4]other things … . The plaintiffs further alleged that the defendant’s “actions were taken with malice based on extreme animus and hatred,” and that his conduct was “knowingly malicious, willful and wanton and/or showed reckless disregard” for the plaintiffs’ rights … . Thus, the plaintiffs demonstrated that the causes of action alleging defamation and defamation per se, as well as the other causes of action that were predicated upon the alleged defamatory communication at issue, under these circumstances, had a substantial basis in law … . Stiloski v Wingate, 2025 NY Slip Op 04803, Second Dept 8-27-25

Practice Point: A post on Linkedin meets the criteria for a SLAPP defense to a defamation action. Here however plaintiff demonstrated the defamation action had a “substantial basis in law.” The action therefore survived the motion to dismiss under the SLAPP statute (Civil Rights Law 76-a).

 

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