You are here: / / INJURY FROM STEPPING INTO AN OPENING THAT IS NOT BIG ENOUGH FOR A PERSON...

INJURY FROM STEPPING INTO AN OPENING THAT IS NOT BIG ENOUGH FOR A PERSON TO FALL THROUGH IS NOT COVERED BY LABOR 240 (1) OR 241 (6) (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined the defendants were entitled to summary judgment on the Labor Law 240 (1) and 241 (6) causes of action because injury caused by stepping in an opening that is not big enough for a person to fall through is not covered:

The defendants established, prima facie, their entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the Labor Law § 240(1) cause of action. The defendants submitted evidence that, although the plaintiff's foot slipped through openings in the rebar grid, the openings were too small for a person's body to fall through. The plaintiff testified at his deposition that his foot could fit through the openings, but not his entire body. The defendants, therefore, established that the openings of the grid did ” not present an elevation-related hazard to which the protective devices enumerated [in Labor Law § 240(1)] are designed to apply'” … . In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact … .

The defendants also established, prima facie, their entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the Labor Law § 241(6) cause of action, which was premised upon alleged violations of 12 NYCRR 23-1.7(b)(1) and (d), (e), and (f). The provision pertaining to “hazardous openings” (12 NYCRR 23-1.7[b][1]) does not apply to openings that are too small for a worker to completely fall through … . Johnson v Lend Lease Constr. LMB, Inc., 2018 NY Slip Op 06004, Second Dept 9-12-18

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (INJURY FROM STEPPING INTO AN OPENING THAT IS NOT BIG ENOUGH FOR A PERSON TO FALL THROUGH IS NOT COVERED BY LABOR 240 (1) OR 241 (6) (SECOND DEPT))

You might also like
THE PROOF DID NOT SUPPORT A FINDING THAT THE ASSAULT SECOND AND CRIMINAL POSSESSION OF A WEAPON THIRD CONVICTIONS WERE BASED ON SEPARATE AND DISTINCT ACTS, THEREFORE CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES WERE NOT WARRANTED; DEFENDANT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADJUDICATED A SECOND FELONY OFFENDER BASED ON A NEW JERSEY CONVICTION WHICH WAS NOT A FELONY IN NEW YORK (SECOND DEPT). ​
THE BANK IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION DID NOT DEMONSTRATE COMPLIANCE WITH RPAPL 1303 WHICH REQUIRES THE NOTICE OF FORECLOSURE TO USE SPECIFIC TYPE SIZES AND A PAPER-COLOR DIFFERENT FROM THE SUMMONS AND COMPLAINT; THE BANK’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT). ​
WHERE AN EMPLOYEE ACTS WITHIN THE SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT, ABSENT A VALID CLAIM FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES, AN EMPLOYER CANNOT BE SUED FOR NEGLIGENT HIRING AND RETENTION.
THERE WAS A QUESTION WHETHER THE EXPANSION OF A PREEXISTING NONCONFORMING USE FELL WITHIN THE NONCONFORMING USE; THE ZONING BOARD OF APPEALS’ RULING ALLOWING THE EXPANSION OF A MARINA WAS ANNULLED (SECOND DEPT). ​
Collateral Estoppel Precluded Plaintiff’s Action—Defendant’s Alleged Default Irrelevant
MOTION TO AMEND THE BILL OF PARTICULARS MADE AFTER THE NOTE OF ISSUE WAS FILED SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF A GOOD EXCUSE FOR THE DELAY; THE MOTION HAD MERIT, DID NOT PRESENT ANY NEW THEORIES AND SOUGHT TO NARROW THE ISSUES FOR TRIAL (SECOND DEPT).
THE EXPERT TESTIMONY OFFERED TO DEMONSTRATE A CAUSAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LOW-BIRTH-WEIGHT AND AUTISM SHOULD HAVE BEEN PRECLUDED; NEW TRIAL ORDERED (SECOND DEPT).
DEFENDANTS IN THIS BREACH OF CONTRACT ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN SANCTIONED FOR SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE, I.E., THE DESTRUCTION OR LOSS OF EMAILS; PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO STRIKE THE ANSWER WAS PROPERLY DENIED; HOWEVER, PLAINTIFFS WERE ENTITLED TO AN ADVERSE INFERENCE JURY INSTRUCTION AT TRIAL (SECOND DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

YELLOWSTONE INJUNCTION NOT WARRANTED IN THIS LEASE-TERMINATION CASE, PLAINTIFF... FAILURE TO SUBMIT AN ORDER FOR SIGNATURE WITHIN 60 DAYS CONSTITUTED ABANDONMENT...