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PLAINTIFFS REQUESTED GENERAL LIABILITY INSURANCE WHICH WAS PROCURED BY THE BROKER; THE BROKER WAS NOT UNDER A DUTY TO ADVISE, GUIDE OR DIRECT PLAINTIFFS TO OBTAIN ADDITIONAL COVERAGE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the plaintiff did not demonstrate the defendant insurance broker breached its duty to procure additional insurance for the plaintiffs. Defendant proved plaintiffs requested general liability insurance which was procured:

“As a general principle, insurance brokers have a common-law duty to obtain requested coverage for their clients within a reasonable time or inform the client of the inability to do so” … . “Absent a specific request for coverage not already in a client’s policy or the existence of a special relationship with the client, an insurance agent or broker has no continuing duty to advise, guide, or direct a client to obtain additional coverage” … .

… [P]laintiffs did not make a specific request for a particular kind of insurance coverage that the defendant failed to procure … . The plaintiffs’ CEO and president testified … [the] plaintiffs needed general liability insurance. The defendant’s vice president of operations testified that the plaintiffs’ application was for general liability insurance, which the record reflects is the kind of insurance the defendant procured for the plaintiffs. In opposition, the plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact  Spa Castle, Inc. v Choice Agency Corp., 2025 NY Slip Op 04676, Second Dept 8-13-25

Practice Point: An insurance broker’s duty to a client does not extend beyond procuring the coverage requested by the client. There is no duty to advise the client to obtain additional coverage.

 

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