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COUNTY COURT DECIDED TO ANONYMIZE POTENTIAL AND EMPANELED JURORS IN THIS MURDER TRIAL; THE MAJORITY CONCLUDED THE ANONYMIZED JURY DID NOT CONSTITUTE A MODE OF PROCEEDINGS ERROR AND DID NOT WARRANT INTERVENTION IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE; THE TWO-JUSTICE DISSENT ARGUED THE EFFECT OF THE ANONYMIZED JURY ON THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE WARRANTED REVERSAL IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, over a two-justice dissent, determined County Court’s “unsupported decision to anonymize potential and empaneled jurors” was not a mode of proceedings error and did not require reversal in the interest of justice:

From the dissent:

Considering the significance of the jury’s determination that defendant acted with the intent to kill rather than some lesser objective, the potential effect of empaneling an anonymous jury on defendant’s presumption of innocence warrants corrective action. We need look no further than the Court of Appeals’ characterization of the use of an anonymous jury, even with the proper factual predicate, as an “extraordinary procedure” (People v Flores, 32 NY3d at 1088). The logical import from the Court’s statement is that an error in the process is equally extraordinary and warrants corrective action. Moreover, although defendant was aware of the names of the jurors, that does not resolve the effect that employing an anonymous jury has on the presumption of innocence. Although not expressly stated, the majority’s decision to forgo corrective action in this case appears to be founded on the conclusion that the error itself is not significant; in other words, a harmless error analysis without explicit reference, which, as previously noted, this Court has already rejected when addressing the improper use of an anonymous jury … . All told, regardless of preservation, the principle remains that an appellate court is not in a position to “adjudge the causal effect that the error in empaneling an anonymous jury might have had on the jury’s verdict” … . For these reasons, we believe corrective action is warranted in this case and would reverse and remit for a new trial. People v Goberdhan, 2025 NY Slip Op 04601, Third Dept 8-7-25

Practice Point: Consult this decision for a discussion of the propriety of anonymizing the jury and the effect an anonymized jury may have on the presumption of innocence.

Same “anonymized jurors” issue and result (over a two-justice dissent) in People v Reinfurt, 2025 NY Slip Op 04603, Third Dept 8-7-25

 

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