You are here: / / THE BROKERAGE AGREEMENT DID NOT GIVE PLAINTIFF THE EXCLUSIVE RIGHT TO NEGOTIATE...
, ,

THE BROKERAGE AGREEMENT DID NOT GIVE PLAINTIFF THE EXCLUSIVE RIGHT TO NEGOTIATE A LOAN ON DEFENDANT’S BEHALF; THEREFORE PLAINTIFF WAS NOT ENTITLED TO A COMMISSION ON A LOAN PROCURED BY DEFENDANT WITHOUT PLAINTIFF’S ASSISTANCE; “EXCLUSIVE RIGHT TO …” CRITERIA IN THIS CONTEXT EXPLAINED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Warhit, determined the brokerage agreement did not give plaintiff the right to a commission when the defendant procured financing on its own:

This appeal presents the opportunity to examine the law of brokerage agreements granting an “exclusive right to sell,” as well as the application of such agreements outside the context of transactions involving the sale or lease of real property. In the present case, the plaintiff broker contends that it had an exclusive agreement to secure certain financing on behalf of the defendant and that it was entitled to a commission even though it was not the procuring cause of a loan the defendant ultimately obtained. * * *

The agreement did not clearly and expressly provide the plaintiff with the exclusive right to deal or negotiate on the defendant’s behalf … . The defendant demonstrated that the plaintiff was not the procuring cause of the loan … . Angelic Real Estate, LLC v Aurora Props., LLC, 2025 NY Slip Op 04223, Second Dept 7-23-25

Practice Point: Consult this opinion for an explanation of the contractual terms necessary to confer on a broker an exclusive right to procure a loan, such that a commission is owed even when the loan is procured without the broker’s assistance (not the case here).

 

You might also like
PLAINTIFF’S CROSSING IN FRONT OF DEFENDANT DRIVER IN AN ATTEMPT TO MAKE A RIGHT TURN FROM THE CENTER LANE VIOLATED THE VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW AND CONSTITUTED THE SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE TRAFFIC ACCIDENT, PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSING PAPERS RAISED ONLY FEIGNED ISSUES OF FACT (SECOND DEPT).
COURT HAS DISCRETION TO ACCEPT UNAUTHORIZED SURREPLIES (SECOND DEPT).
THE EVIDENCE SUBMITTED IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION, INCLUDING AN ATTORNEY AFFIDAVIT, WAS NOT IN ADMISSIBLE FORM, THE MOTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
“Lack of Standing” Defense Waived by Not Asserting It In the Answer—“Lack of Standing” Not a Jurisdictional Defect—Sua Sponte Dismissal for “Lack of Standing” Not Warranted
NEW YORK DOES NOT RECOGNIZE SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE AS AN INDEPENDENT TORT, THE COMPLAINT SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT).
Open and Obvious Condition Precluded Slip and Fall Suit
IT WAS ALLEGED DEFENDANTS-ATTORNEYS DID NOT INSTRUCT THE DECEDENT TO REVOKE THE TOTTEN TRUSTS SO THE FUNDS WOULD BE DISTRIBUTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH HER WISHES AS SET OUT IN THE WILL AND TRUST DRAFTED BY DEFENDANTS; DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
NON-PROFIT RETREAT ENTITLED TO REAL PROPERTY TAX EXEMPTION FOR ENTIRE PROPERTY, NOT JUST THE DEVELOPED PORTION.

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION LAW REQUIRES SCHOOL DISTRICTS TO... THE ADULT SURVIVORS ACT, CPLR SECTION 214-J, REVIVES AN OTHERWISE TIME-BARRED...