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THE BROKERAGE AGREEMENT DID NOT GIVE PLAINTIFF THE EXCLUSIVE RIGHT TO NEGOTIATE A LOAN ON DEFENDANT’S BEHALF; THEREFORE PLAINTIFF WAS NOT ENTITLED TO A COMMISSION ON A LOAN PROCURED BY DEFENDANT WITHOUT PLAINTIFF’S ASSISTANCE; “EXCLUSIVE RIGHT TO …” CRITERIA IN THIS CONTEXT EXPLAINED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Warhit, determined the brokerage agreement did not give plaintiff the right to a commission when the defendant procured financing on its own:

This appeal presents the opportunity to examine the law of brokerage agreements granting an “exclusive right to sell,” as well as the application of such agreements outside the context of transactions involving the sale or lease of real property. In the present case, the plaintiff broker contends that it had an exclusive agreement to secure certain financing on behalf of the defendant and that it was entitled to a commission even though it was not the procuring cause of a loan the defendant ultimately obtained. * * *

The agreement did not clearly and expressly provide the plaintiff with the exclusive right to deal or negotiate on the defendant’s behalf … . The defendant demonstrated that the plaintiff was not the procuring cause of the loan … . Angelic Real Estate, LLC v Aurora Props., LLC, 2025 NY Slip Op 04223, Second Dept 7-23-25

Practice Point: Consult this opinion for an explanation of the contractual terms necessary to confer on a broker an exclusive right to procure a loan, such that a commission is owed even when the loan is procured without the broker’s assistance (not the case here).

 

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