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FILING A REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL INTERVENTION CONSTITUTED TAKING PROCEEDINGS FOR THE ENTRY OF JUDGMENT WITHIN ONE YEAR OF DEFENDANT’S DEFAULT; THE FORECLOSURE ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED AS ABANDONED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined this foreclosure action should not have been dismissed as abandoned on the ground plaintiff failed to take action within one year of defendant’s default. In fact plaintiff filed a request for judicial intervention which constituted taking “proceedings for the entry of judgment within one year after the default:”

Pursuant to CPLR 3215(c), “[i]f the plaintiff fails to take proceedings for the entry of judgment within one year after the default, the court shall not enter judgment but shall dismiss the complaint as abandoned . . . unless sufficient cause is shown why the complaint should not be dismissed.” To avoid dismissal pursuant to CPLR 3215(c), “[i]t is not necessary for a plaintiff to actually obtain a default judgment within one year of the default” … . “Rather, ‘as long as proceedings are being taken, and these proceedings manifest an intent not to abandon the case but to seek a judgment, the case should not be subject to dismissal'” … .

Here, the plaintiff demonstrated that, within one year after the defendant’s default, the plaintiff filed a request for judicial intervention that sought a foreclosure settlement conference as mandated by CPLR 3408. “Where, as here, a settlement conference is a necessary prerequisite to obtaining a default judgment (see CPLR 3408[a], [m]), a formal judicial request for such a conference in connection with an ongoing demand for the ultimate relief sought in the complaint constitutes ‘proceedings for entry of judgment’ within the meaning of CPLR 3215(c)” … . U.S. Bank N.A. v Newson, 2025 NY Slip Op 04269, Second Dept 7-23-25

Practice Point: The CPLR does not require a plaintiff to obtain a default judgment within a year of the default to preclude dismissal. Plaintiff need only take some action which indicates it does not intend to abandon the action. Here the filing of a request for judicial intervention was sufficient.

 

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