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AN UNSECURED LADDER THAT SLIPS OUT FROM UNDER THE PLAINTIFF WARRANTS SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE LABOR LAW 240(1) CAUSE OF ACTION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on the Labor Law 240(1) cause of action in this ladder fall case should have been granted. The ladder was not secured and slipped out from under the plaintiff, who fell 10 to 12 feet:

“Labor Law § 240(1) imposes upon owners, contractors, and their agents a nondelegable duty to provide workers proper protection from elevation-related hazards” … . “To prevail on a Labor Law § 240(1) cause of action, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant violated the statute and that such violation was a proximate cause of his or her injuries” … . “Whether a device provides proper protection is a question of fact, except when the device collapses, moves, falls, or otherwise fails to support the plaintiff and his or her materials” … . “Specifically, with respect to accidents involving ladders, liability will be imposed when the evidence shows that the subject ladder was . . . inadequately secured and that . . . the failure to secure the ladder[ ] was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff’s injuries” … .

Here, the plaintiff demonstrated, prima facie, that he was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of liability on the cause of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 240(1) insofar as asserted against the defendant. In support of his motion, the plaintiff submitted transcripts of his deposition testimony and the deposition testimony of a witness to his accident which showed that the plaintiff was exposed to an elevation risk within the ambit of Labor Law § 240(1), that the ladder slipped out from under the plaintiff as he descended from the roof, that the ladder fell away from the wall, and that the inadequately secured ladder was a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries … . In opposition, the defendant failed to raise a plausible view of the evidence—enough to raise a triable issue of fact—that there was no statutory violation and that the plaintiff’s own acts were the sole cause of the accident … . Ruiz v Ewan, 2025 NY Slip Op 04032, Second Dept 7-2-25

Practice Point: Here evidence the ladder was tethered to the house after the accident did not raise a question of fact about whether the ladder was unsecured when it slipped out from under plaintiff.

 

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