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IN THIS STREET-STOP-FRISK CASE, THE POLICE OFFICER TESTIFIED HE SAW DEFENDANT PUT A BLACK OBJECT IN HIS JACKET POCKET, BUT HE DID NOT TESTIFY HE HAD A REASONABLE SUSPICION THE OBJECT WAS A FIREARM; THEREFORE THE PEOPLE DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE LEGALITY OF THE STOP AND FRISK; THE SUPPRESSION MOTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECON DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court’s denial of the suppression motion in this street-stop case, determined the police officer, Espinal, did not have a reasonable suspicion that the object defendant put in his pocket was a firearm. Therefore the officer did not have a sufficient reason to grab defendant’s pocket:

While driving down 193rd Street toward a dead end, Detective Espinal spotted a vehicle illegally parked in the middle of the dead end’s cul-de-sac. Detective Espinal testified that there appeared to be an individual in the driver’s seat and another individual standing outside the vehicle by the driver’s window. Detective Espinal observed that the individual standing outside the vehicle, who was later identified as the defendant, was holding a black object in his right hand, although Detective Espinal could not identify the object. Detective Espinal testified that when the defendant made eye contact with him, the defendant put the object into the right front pocket of the jacket that he was wearing and proceeded to walk toward the police vehicle with his hands in his jacket pockets. As the defendant continued to walk toward the police vehicle, Detective Espinal exited the vehicle and directed the defendant to take his hands out of his jacket pockets and put his hands up. Although the defendant initially complied, as Detective Espinal got closer, the defendant began to reach down toward his right jacket pocket. Upon seeing the defendant reach for his jacket pocket, Detective Espinal grabbed the pocket and felt a firearm inside. Detective Espinal withdrew a firearm from the defendant’s pocket and instructed one of his partners to place the defendant under arrest. * * *

… Detective Espinal did not have the required reasonable suspicion to frisk the defendant. Detective Espinal’s testimony is clear. He saw the defendant outside the illegally parked vehicle and watched as the defendant placed a black object in his jacket pocket. Detective Espinal did not testify as to what he thought the object was or whether he had any reasonable suspicion to believe that the object was a weapon of any kind, let alone a firearm. The only instance of illegality that Detective Espinal testified to was the illegally parked vehicle, which would not have provided the officers with a basis to frisk the defendant … . People v Taylor, 2025 NY Slip Op 02937, Second Dept 5-14-25

Practice Point: The People have the burden of demonstrating the legality of the police conduct in a stop and frisk. Here the officer testified he saw defendant put a black object in his pocket, but he did not testify he suspected the object was a firearm. The fact that the incident took place in a high-crime area was not enough to provide reasonable suspicion sufficient for a stop and frisk.​

 

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