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RE-SERVICE AFTER EXPIRATION OF STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS PROPERLY ALLOWED.

The Second Department determined re-service of the summons and complaint after the statute of limitations had passed was properly allowed:

The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in granting that branch of the plaintiffs’ cross motion which was pursuant to CPLR 306-b to extend the time to serve the defendant with the summons and complaint in the interest of justice … . While the action was timely commenced, the statute of limitations had expired when the plaintiffs cross-moved for relief, the plaintiffs re-served the defendant within a reasonable time after learning that the timely service of process was being challenged by the defendant as defective, and the defendant had actual notice of the action within 120 days of its commencement … . Furthermore, after re-serving the defendant, the plaintiffs cross-moved within a reasonable time for an extension of time to serve the defendant, and there was no identifiable prejudice to the defendant attributable to the delay in service … . Rivera v Rodriguez, 2016 NY Slip Op 05855, 2nd Dept 8-24-16

CIVIL PROCEDURE (RE-SERVICE AFTER EXPIRATION OF STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS PROPERLY ALLOWED)/STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS (RE-SERVICE AFTER EXPIRATION OF STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS PROPERLY ALLOWED)

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