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ALTHOUGH THE DEFENDANT WAS NOT THE PAROLE ABSCONDER FOR WHOM THE POLICE HAD AN ARREST WARRANT, THE MAJORITY DETERMINED THE PEOPLE PROVED THE POLICE REASONABLY BELIEVED DEFENDANT WAS THE PAROLE ABSCONDER WHEN THEY APPROACHED HIM, WHICH JUSTIFIED THE PURSUIT OF THE DEFENDANT; TWO DISSENTERS ARGUED THE PROOF AT THE SUPPRESSION HEARING, WHICH DID NOT INCLUDE TESTIMONY BY THE OFFICERS WHO FIRST APPROACHED DEFENDANT, DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE POLICE REASONABLY BELIEVED DEFENDANT WAS THE SUBJECT OF THE ARREST WARRANT (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, over a two-justice dissent, determined the police reasonably (but erroneously) believed defendant was the parole absconder for whom they had an arrest warrant. The pursuit and arrest, based in part on observing the defendant discard an handgun, were deemed proper:

… [T]here is no dispute that the apprehension team had probable cause to arrest the parole absconder inasmuch as an arrest warrant had been issued. As for the second element, “[t]he reasonableness of the arresting officers’ conduct must be determined by considering the totality of the circumstances surrounding the arrest”… , and “great deference should be given to the determination of the suppression court, which had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses and to assess their credibility, and its factual findings should not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous” … . Even though “[f]light alone . . . is insufficient to justify [a] pursuit” … , we conclude that under the totality of the circumstances present here the arresting officer’s testimony establishes that he reasonably believed that defendant was the absconder when he initiated his pursuit. Defendant closely matched the height and weight provided in the parole absconder’s description, covered his face with a ski mask, was in the location provided by the absconder’s girlfriend, and immediately fled upon being approached by one of the apprehension team’s unmarked vehicles. Inasmuch as the initial pursuit and subsequent arrest of defendant—which occurred after he was observed holding and then discarding a handgun—were lawful, the court did not err in refusing to suppress the physical evidence recovered during the post-arrest search of defendant and the surrounding area … .

From the dissent:

In our view, however, it does not appear that the pursuing officers had even a subjectively reasonable belief that defendant was the parolee for whom they had an arrest warrant. Indeed, the People, who are “put to the burden of going forward to show the legality of the police conduct in the first instance” … , failed to adduce anything other than that defendant matched the generic height and weight of the average male in the general population. Notably, the People failed to call the approaching officers, and thus adduced no testimony with respect to their actions, observations, or whether they believed—reasonably or not—that defendant was the parole absconder, particularly in the absence of any evidence that they chased defendant when he fled.

The officers who did testify at the suppression hearing—the pursuing officers—testified simply that defendant roughly matched the height and weight of the parolee and that he fled. As set forth above, the pursuing officers did not testify that the approaching officers gave chase when defendant fled. Coupled with the pursuing officer’s testimony that at the point when defendant fled, he was “free to leave,” the record at the suppression hearing undercuts any possible claim that the pursuing officers were not simply chasing a man who fled, but that they actually believed defendant to be the parolee for whom they had an arrest warrant. People v Jones, 2025 NY Slip Op 01524, Fourth Dept 3-14-25

Practice Point: Consult this decision for insight into the validity of an arrest of the “wrong person,” i.e., the approach, pursuit and arrest of one person based upon an arrest warrant for issued for another.

 

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