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A COURT MAY CONVERT A MOTION TO DISMISS TO A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT WITHOUT NOTICE WHERE A PURE QUESTION OF LAW IS INVOLVED; THE STRICTER STANDARDS FOR NON-COMPETITION AGREEMENTS IN THE EMPLOYMENT CONTEXT DO NOT APPLY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE SALE OF A BUSINESS (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, noted that Supreme Court properly dispensed with notice when it converted a motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment on a contractual-interpretation issue, and further noted the difference between non-competition agreements in the employment context and in the sale-of-a-business context. Here defendant sold his business, including goodwill, to plaintiff and then was employed by plaintiff:

… [A]lthough the court is normally required to give notice to the parties before converting a motion to dismiss to one for summary judgment … , the court properly dispensed with the statutory notice here inasmuch as the issue presented “rested entirely upon the construction and interpretation of an unambiguous contractual provision . . . [that] exclusively involve[d] issues of law which were fully appreciated and argued by the parties’ ” … . …

Because plaintiff sold his business to defendant, including the goodwill of that business, the enforceability of the restrictive covenants must be evaluated pursuant to the standard applicable to the sale of a business rather than the “stricter standard of reasonableness” applicable to employment contracts … . It is well settled that a covenant restricting the right of a seller of a business to compete with the buyer is enforceable if its duration and scope are “reasonably necessary to protect the buyer’s legitimate interest in the purchased asset” … . Frank v Metalico Rochester, Inc., 2019 NY Slip Op 05863, Fourth Dept 7-31-19

 

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