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ALTHOUGH THE CAUSES OF ACTION WERE PLED AS “CONVERSION” AND “UNJUST ENRICHMENT,” THEY STEMMED FROM ALLEGED BREACHES OF THE PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT; THEREFORE THE SIX-YEAR BREACH-OF-CONTRACT STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS APPLIED, NOT THE THREE-YEAR TORT STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department determined that, although the causes of action were couched as “conversion” and “unjust enrichment,” they stemmed from the alleged breach of a partnership agreement. Therefore the six-year contract, not the three-year tort, statute of limitations applied:

… [T]he causes of action were subject to a six-year statute of limitations rather than a three-year statute of limitations. “In determining which limitations period is applicable to a given cause of action, the court must look to the substance of the allegations rather than to the characterization of those allegations by the parties” … . “[W]hen damage to property or pecuniary interests is involved, the six-year statute governs regardless of how the theory of liability is described, as long as the asserted liability had its genesis in the contractual relationship of the parties” … . Thus, “where liability is premised on a contractual relationship, the six-year statute of limitations applies” … . Fernandes v Fernandes, 2025 NY Slip Op 00848, Second Dept 2-13-25

Practice Point: Here the causes of action for conversion and unjust enrichment stemmed from alleged breaches of the partnership agreement, so the breach-of-contract, not the tort, statute of limitations applied.

 

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