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THE JUDGE’S FAILURE TO GIVE THE CIRCUMSTANTIAL-EVIDENCE JURY INSTRUCTION IN THIS ARSON/MURDER CASE REQUIRED REVERSAL AND A NEW TRIAL (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing defendant’s arson, murder and reckless endangerment convictions, determined the trial judge should have given the circumstantial evidence instruction to the jury:

“It is well settled that a trial court must grant a defendant’s request for a circumstantial evidence charge when the proof of the defendant’s guilt rests solely on circumstantial evidence . . . By contrast, where there is both direct and circumstantial evidence of the defendant’s guilt, such a charge need not be given” … . …[T]his was not a case with ” ‘both direct and circumstantial evidence of . . . defendant’s guilt,’ ” which would negate the need for a circumstantial evidence charge … . Indeed, none of the evidence presented at trial “prove[d] directly a disputed fact without requiring an inference to be made” … .

Further, this is not “the exceptional case where the failure to give the circumstantial evidence charge was harmless error” … . Although ” ‘overwhelming proof of guilt’ cannot be defined with mathematical precision” … , it necessarily requires more evidence of guilt than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. If that were not so, all errors would be harmless in cases where the verdict is not against the weight of the evidence … .

Here, the strongest evidence linking defendant to the crime is the video surveillance recording. As noted, that video, which is grainy and shot from a distance, depicts a flickering or glow as defendant exits the premises, which promptly grows into a blaze as defendant walks away. There is no way to discern from the video the exact moment that the fire is set or precisely how the fire began. “In order for the jury to find defendant guilty it had to make a number of logical leaps connecting defendant to the crimes charged. Had the trial court given the circumstantial evidence charge, alerting the jury of the need to exclude to a moral certainty every other reasonable hypothesis of innocence,” we conclude that the verdict may have been different … . People v Exford, 2025 NY Slip Op 00536, Fourth Dept 1-30-25

Practice Point: In this arson and murder case, the failure to give the circumstantial-evidence jury instruction warranted a new trial. The jury was required to make several “logical leaps,” based upon grainy video evidence showing defendant walking away from a building which caught fire, to convict.

 

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