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RESTITUTION PAYABLE TO THE CRIME VICTIMS BOARD EXCEEDED THE STATUTORY CAP FOR A FELONY (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department noted that the restitution amount payable to the Crime Victims Board exceeded the statutory cap:

… [T]he amount of restitution payable to the Crime Victims Board for the family of Sherman Richardson improperly exceeds $15,000 and violates the statutory cap in Penal Law § 60.27(5)(a). Penal Law § 60.27(5)(a) provides that, except with the consent of the defendant or in instances where restitution is ordered as a condition of probation or conditional discharge, “the amount of restitution or reparation required by the court shall not exceed fifteen thousand dollars in the case of a conviction for a felony” … . This provision is qualified by Penal Law § 60.27(5)(b), which allows a court to order restitution in excess of this amount as long as the sum is “limited to the return of the victim’s property, including money, or the equivalent value thereof” … . As for the restitution payable to the Crime Victims Board for Richardson’s family, the amount in excess of $15,000 did not meet the requirements of Penal Law § 60.27(5), since the amount of the defendant’s restitution set by the Supreme Court was not intended as reimbursement for the value of the property destroyed. However, restitution in the sum of $3,374.75 to Enterprise Rent-A-Car, the owner of the vehicle operated by the defendant and later set on fire, was proper … . People v Grant, 2020 NY Slip Op 03674, Second Dept 7-1-20

 

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