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Criteria for Vicarious Liability of Hospital for Actions of Non-Employee Physician Explained (Not Met Here)

The Second Department determined summary judgment dismissing the complaint should have been granted to defendant hospital. The suit against the hospital was based upon the actions of a non-employee physician chosen by the plaintiff.  The Second Department succinctly explained the theories under which a hospital may be liable for the actions of a non-employee physician (none of which applied here):

Generally speaking, a hospital may not be held vicariously liable for the negligence of a private attending physician chosen by the patient … . Moreover, so long as the resident physicians and nurses employed by the hospital have merely carried out that private attending physician’s orders, a hospital may not be held vicariously liable for resulting injuries … . These rules will not, however, shield a hospital from liability in three situations. The first is when the private physician’s orders “so greatly deviate from normal medical practice that [the hospital’s employees] should be held liable for failing to intervene” … . Put another way, a hospital may be held liable when the staff follows orders despite knowing “that the doctor’s orders are so clearly contraindicated by normal practice that ordinary prudence requires inquiry into the correctness of the orders” … . Second, a hospital may be held liable when its employees have committed independent acts of negligence … . Third, a hospital may be held liable for the negligence of a private, nonemployee physician on a theory of ostensible or apparent agency … . Doria v Benisch, 2015 NY Slip Op 06109, 2nd Dept 7-15-15

 

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