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ALTHOUGH A JUDGE HAS THE DISCRETION TO PROHIBIT A PARTY FROM BRINGING ANY FURTHER PETITIONS FOR CUSTODY MODIFICATION, HERE FAMILY COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION; FATHER HAD NEVER FILED FRIVOLOUS PETITIONS OR FILED PETITIONS OUT OF ILL WILL OR SPITE (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, modifying Family Court, determined Family Court should not have prohibited father from filing any further custody modification petitions because father had not filed frivolous petitions or filed petitions out of ill will or spite:

Family Court improvidently exercised its discretion in prohibiting the father from filing any further modification petitions without the permission of the court. “While public policy generally mandates free access to the courts, a party may forfeit that right if he or she abuses the judicial process by engaging in meritless litigation motivated by spite or ill will” … . Here, there is no basis in the record to demonstrate that the father filed frivolous petitions or filed petitions out of ill will or spite … . Matter of Freyer v Macruari, 2025 NY Slip Op 00217, Second Dept 1-15-25

Practice Point: Family Court has the discretion to prohibit a party from bringing any future custody modification petitions, it can only do so where the party has filed frivolous motions or has filed motions out of ill will or spite.

 

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HERE THE PETITION FOR MODIFICATION OF CUSTODY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED... PETITIONER ADEQUATELY DESCRIBED THE RECORDS SOUGHT FROM THE POLICE DEPARTMENT...