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THE BREACH OF CONTRACT CAUSE OF ACTION ALLEGING DEFENDANT ATTORNEY OVERBILLED SHOULD HAVE SURVIVED THE MOTION TO DISMISS DESPITE THE DISMISSAL OF THE LEGAL MALPRACTICE CAUSE OF ACTION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the cause of action for breach of contract alleging overbilling by defendant attorney (Drexel) should have survived the motion to dismiss, even though the legal malpractice cause of action was properly dismissed:

… [T]he Supreme Court should have denied that branch of [defendant-attorney] Drexel’s motion which was to dismiss so much of the first breach of contract cause of action as alleged that Drexel overbilled and charged the plaintiff for unnecessary legal services … . In opposition to that branch of Drexel’s motion which was to dismiss the first breach of contract cause of action, the plaintiff submitted an affidavit in which he averred that Drexel double-billed him for legal services in the sum of $291,000 and charged him at least $70,000 for unnecessary legal services. Contrary to Drexel’s contention, the plaintiff’s claim that Drexel overbilled and charged him for unnecessary legal services is distinct from a legal malpractice cause of action, as the plaintiff’s claim does not challenge the quality of Drexel’s work … . Dubon v Drexel, 2021 NY Slip Op 04119, Second Dept 6-30-21

 

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