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PLAINTIFF SUED THE COUNTY SHERIFF SEEKING A DECLARATORY JUDGMENT THAT A LOCAL COURT WHICH ISSUES A SECURING ORDER FOR A NONQUALIFYING OFFENSE VIOLATES THE ACCUSED’S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS; THE FOURTH DEPARTMENT DETERMINED THERE WAS NO JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERY INVOLVING THE SHERIFF WHO IS BOUND TO OBEY A COURT’S SECURING ORDER; THE REAL DISPUTE IS WITH THE COURT WHICH ISSUES THE ORDER IN APPARENT VIOLATION OF A STATUTE (FOURTH DEPT). ​

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court and dismissing the declaratory judgment action, determined there was no justiciable controversy. Plaintiff sued the County Sheriff seeking a declaration that “assigning a local court to arraign a criminal defendant with two previous felony convictions violates the constitutional rights of the accused because local courts lack the ability to order release or set bail under those circumstances.” The issue arose because of a conflict among provisions of the Criminal Procedure Law:

… City Court issued a securing order that committed [defendant] to the custody of the Sheriff on the basis of CPL 530.20 (2) (a) (double predicate provision). The double predicate provision states that a city, town, or village court (hereinafter, local court) may not order release on recognizance or bail when the criminal defendant, like plaintiff, has two previous felony convictions. Plaintiff further alleged that the double predicate provision conflicts with CPL 510.10 (4) (qualifying offense provision), which limits the court’s ability to issue a securing order imposing bail or remand to situations in which the criminal defendant stands charged with an enumerated qualifying offense (see also CPL 510.10 [3]). * * *

We conclude that plaintiff’s allegations fail to “demonstrate the existence of a bona fide justiciable controversy” inasmuch as there is no “real dispute between adverse parties, involving substantial legal interests for which a declaration of rights will have some practical effect” … . … “[T]he heart of the dispute is not any action taken by the Sheriff but rather whether the local . . . court must remand a given [criminal] defendant such as [plaintiff] to the custody of the Sheriff.” * * * Plaintiff’s real dispute is with the local court that issues a securing order ostensibly in violation of the qualifying offense provision, not with the Sheriff who is bound to obey the securing order. Where, as here, “there is no genuine dispute between the parties, the courts are precluded, as a matter of law, from issuing a declaratory judgment” … . Parker v Hilton, 2024 NY Slip Op 06456, Fourth Dept 12-20-24

Practice Point: Here the plaintiff’s dispute was not with the Sheriff, who is bound to obey a securing order, but was with the local court that issued the securing order which ostensibly violated a statute and the accused’s constitutional rights. Therefore there was no justiciable controversy between plaintiff and the Sheriff.

 

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