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PLAINTIFF ASSUMED THE RISK OF TRIPPING OVER BENCHES NEAR THE FIELD WHERE HE WAS PLAYING FOOTBALL, SUPREME COURT REVERSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the benches near the field where plaintiff was playing football were open and obvious and plaintiff had assumed the risk of tripping over them:

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Under the doctrine of primary assumption of risk, “[i]f the risks of [a sporting] activity are fully comprehended or perfectly obvious to [a voluntary participant], he or she has consented to them and the [defendant] has discharged its duty of care by making the conditions as safe as they appear to be” … . “Risks inherent in a sporting activity are those which are known, apparent, natural, or reasonably foreseeable consequences of the participation” … . “This includes risks associated with the construction of the playing surface and any open and obvious condition on it” …  “If the risks are known by or perfectly obvious to the player, he or she has consented to them and the property owner has discharged its duty of care by making the conditions as safe as they appear to be” … .

Here, according to the infant plaintiff’s deposition testimony, which the defendants submitted in support of their motion, there was nothing marking the area where the benches were located as the end zone, but if the ball was caught in the vicinity of the bench, the campers would consider that a touchdown. The infant plaintiff also testified that he flipped over one of the benches as he was running for a pass and that, prior to turning to catch the ball, he had run the full length of the field looking ahead toward the benches, which were situated alongside the volleyball courts. Consequently, the bench was open, obvious, clearly visible, and known to the infant plaintiff … . Since the infant plaintiff, who had been playing football on this field for more than an hour when the accident occurred, was aware of that condition and voluntarily chose to play on the field, he assumed the risk of injury of colliding into one of the benches when attempting to score … . E.B. v Achim, 2017 NY Slip Op 09115, Second Dept 12-27-17

 

NEGLIGENCE (PLAINTIFF ASSUMED THE RISK OF TRIPPING OVER BENCHES NEAR THE FIELD WHERE HE WAS PLAYING FOOTBALL, SUPREME COURT REVERSED (SECOND DEPT))/SLIP AND FALL (SPORTS, PLAINTIFF ASSUMED THE RISK OF TRIPPING OVER BENCHES NEAR THE FIELD WHERE HE WAS PLAYING FOOTBALL, SUPREME COURT REVERSED (SECOND DEPT))/ASSUMPTION OF THE RISK (PLAINTIFF ASSUMED THE RISK OF TRIPPING OVER BENCHES NEAR THE FIELD WHERE HE WAS PLAYING FOOTBALL, SUPREME COURT REVERSED (SECOND DEPT))/SPORTS (SLIP AND FALL, PLAINTIFF ASSUMED THE RISK OF TRIPPING OVER BENCHES NEAR THE FIELD WHERE HE WAS PLAYING FOOTBALL, SUPREME COURT REVERSED (SECOND DEPT))

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