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THE COVID-19 TOLLS SUSPENDED THE RUNNING OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IN THIS PERSONAL INJURY CASE RENDERING THE ACTION TIMELY COMMENCED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the COVID-19 tolls suspended the running of the statute of limitations in this personal injury case, rendering the action timely commenced:

Pursuant to CPLR 214 (5), a three-year statute of limitations applies to an action to recover damages for personal injury. Plaintiff’s cause of action accrued on June 27, 2019, the date of the accident … , and plaintiff did not commence this action until June 29, 2022. However … plaintiff established that the statute of limitations was tolled. On March 20, 2020, then-Governor Andrew Cuomo issued Executive Order (A. Cuomo) No. 202.8, which tolled “any specific time limit for the commencement, filing, or service of any legal action, notice, motion, or other process or proceeding, as prescribed by the procedural laws of the state, including but not limited to . . . the civil practice law and rules” … . Then-Governor Cuomo issued a series of nine subsequent executive orders that extended the tolling period, eventually through November 3, 2020 … . “A toll does not extend the statute of limitations indefinitely but merely suspends the running of the applicable statute of limitations for a finite and, in this instance, readily identifiable time period” … . “[T]he period of the toll is excluded from the calculation of the time in which the plaintiff can commence an action” … . Paul v Lyons, 2024 NY Slip Op 05661, Fourth Dept 11-15-24

Practice Point: Consult this decision for a concise explanation of how the COVID-19 tolls affect the running of a statute of limitations.

 

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