You are here: / / SUPREME COURT DISMISSED THE INDICTMENT ON SPEEDY-TRIAL GROUNDS, FINDING...
,

SUPREME COURT DISMISSED THE INDICTMENT ON SPEEDY-TRIAL GROUNDS, FINDING THAT THE PEOPLE HAD NOT COMPLIED WITH THEIR DISCOVERY OBLIGATIONS AT THE TIME THE PEOPLE INDICATED THEY WERE READY FOR TRIAL; THE DISMISSAL ORDER WAS NEVER SERVED ON THE PEOPLE SO THE 30-DAY APPEAL PERIOD NEVER STARTED RUNNING RENDERING THE PEOPLE’S APPEAL TIMELY; THE FAILURE TO TURN OVER “DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND COMMUNITY SERVICES” DOCUMENTS DID NOT VIOLATE THE PEOPLE’S DISCOVERY OBLIGATIONS BECAUSE THE PEOPLE DID NOT POSSESS THOSE DOCUMENTS (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined (1) the People’s appeal was timely because defendant never served the order dismissing the indictment on them so the 30-day appeal period never started running, and (2) the People were not obligated to turn over Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCCS) documents to comply with their discovery obligations because the People did not possess those documents:

The Court of Appeals has “interpreted CPL 460.10 (1) (a) ‘to require prevailing party service’—not just the handing out of an order by the court—’to commence the time for filing a notice of appeal’ ” … . Here, the record establishes that the People received a copy of the original order, but there is “no evidence that [defendant] ever served the order as required by CPL 460.10 (1) (a)” … . Inasmuch as the record fails to establish that defendant ever served the People with a copy of the original order, the People’s 30-day period to appeal never began to run and the People’s appeal is therefore timely … . * * *

… [A]ssuming … that the parole officer’s disciplinary records from DOCCS met the relevancy prong as being related to the subject matter of the case, we conclude that the People established that those records did not meet the possessory prong required to prompt their initial discovery obligation with respect thereto (see CPL 245.20 [1] …). “[F]or the purposes of discovery, DOCCS is not a ‘law enforcement’ agency” and is ” ‘outside of the legal or practical control of local prosecutors’ and, therefore, the People cannot be deemed to be in constructive possession of that which DOCCS possesses” … . People v Walker, 2024 NY Slip Op 05662, Fourth Dept 11-15-24

Practice Point: If the defendant wins a motion to dismiss the indictment, the defendant must serve the People with the dismissal order or the People’s 30-day appeal period does not start running.

Practice Point: The People do not violate their discovery obligations by failing to turn over documents which are in the possession of another agency, here the Department of Corrections and Community Services (DOCCS).

 

You might also like
THIS WAS NOT A CIRCUMSTANCE WHERE THE ACCUSATORY INSTRUMENTS, AS OPPOSED TO THE LANGUAGE OF THE FLORIDA STATUTE ALONE, CAN BE USED TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE FLORIDA CONVICTION ALLOWED DEFENDANT TO BE SENTENCED AS A SECOND CHILD SEXUAL ASSAULT FELONY OFFENDER; THE FLORIDA STATUTE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DEEMED A PREDICATE FELONY (FOURTH DEPT). ​
JUDGE WHO WAS THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY WHEN DEFENDANT WAS INDICTED WAS DISQUALIFIED FROM HEARING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO VACATE HIS CONVICTION (FOURTH DEPT).
THE APPLICABLE INDUSTRIAL CODE PROVISION APPLIES TO MORE THAN JUST THE OBSTRUCTION OF PASSAGEWAYS; IT ALSO APPLIES TO BUILDING MATERIAL WHICH IS NOT PROPERLY STORED AND SECURED (AND FALLS); PLAINTIFF’S LABOR LAW 241 (6) CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (FOURTH DEPT).
QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER SNOW PLOWING CONTRACTOR LAUNCHED AN INSTRUMENT OF HARM OR CREATED OR EXACERBATED A DANGEROUS CONDITION IN THIS ICE AND SNOW SLIP AND FALL CASE (FOURTH DEPT).
BOTH THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS REQUIRE THE SAME BLOCKBURGER TEST FOR DOUBLE JEOPARDY (FOURTH DEPT).
THE MAJORITY IN THIS DOG-BITE CASE DETERMINED DEFENDANT DID NOT DEMONSTRATE A LACK OF KNOWLEDGE OF THE DOG’S VICIOUS PROPENSITIES; TWO DISSENTERS ARGUED DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPERLY GRANTED BECAUSE THE DOG HAD NEVER EXHIBITED VICIOUS BEHAVIOR BEFORE (FOURTH DEPT).
THE WARRANT AUTHORIZING THE SEARCH OF THE CONTENTS OF DEFENDANT’S CELL PHONE DID NOT RESTRICT THE SEARCH TO EVIDENCE OF ANY PARTICULAR CRIME AND DID NOT INCORPORATE THE POLICE INVESTIGATOR’S AFFIDAVIT WHICH PURPORTEDLY LAID OUT THE BASIS FOR FINDING PROBABLE CAUSE; THE WARRANT DID NOT MEET THE “PARTICULARITY REQUIREMENT” (FOURTH DEPT).
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED; THE WAS NO ALLEGATION THE PARTY TO BE ADDED AS A DEFENDANT HAD ANY INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY IN DISPUTE; AND THE CIVIL CONSPIRACY CAUSE OF ACTION PLAINTIFF SOUGHT TO ADD IS NOT RECOGNIZED IN NEW YORK; THEREFORE THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS WERE PATENTLY DEVOID OF MERIT (FOURTH DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

THE COVID-19 TOLLS SUSPENDED THE RUNNING OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IN THIS... MOTHER SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DEEMED COLLATERALLY ESTOPPED FROM PRESENTING EVIDENCE...