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THE LEASE FOR THE LAND WHERE PLAINTIFF PLANTED CROPS HAD A MUTUAL 90-DAY TERMINATION PROVISION WHICH DEFENDANTS EXERCISED; DEFENDANTS THEN DESTROYED THE CROPS MONTHS BEFORE THEY COULD BE HARVESTED; PLAINTIFFS’ COMPLAINT STATED CAUSES OF ACTION FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT AND CONVERSION BASED UPON THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING AND THE THEORY OF EMBLEMENTS (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Pritzker, over a partial dissent, determined the complaint stated causes of action for breach of contract and conversion. Plaintiffs leased land from defendants to grow crops. There was a provision in the lease allowing termination upon 90 days notice. Plaintiffs alleged they planted crops in the fall of 2019 which could not be harvested until the fall of 2020. Defendants elected to terminate the contract effective May 2020. In May 2020 defendants entered the land and destroyed the crops with herbicide: The Third Department found that the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and the theory of emblements should be harmonized with the termination provision:

… [T]he purpose of the lease agreement was clear and, since both parties were aware that the land was to be used to seed, maintain and harvest the crops[*3], defendants were under a contractual duty to allow plaintiffs to fulfill this purpose under the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing … . Against this backdrop, both parties had the express right to terminate the lease agreement with 90 days’ notice. Therefore, plaintiffs’ right of possession would extinguish upon rightful termination and, as such, without an express or implied obligation, plaintiffs would be unable to recover on a breach of contract theory … . However, given the nature of the agricultural lease agreement, the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and the theory of emblements must be harmonized with the mutual termination provision. * * *

… [G]iven the purpose of the lease agreement as well as the early termination provision, the doctrine of emblements created an implied contractual term granting plaintiffs a right of reentry to harvest their crops in the event that defendants exercised the early termination provision. * * *

… [P]laintiffs have adequately alleged a possessory interest in the … crops because, under the doctrine of emblements, they retained a right to harvest and take away those crops after defendants terminated their tenancy early … . Together with plaintiffs’ allegation that defendants destroyed the cereal crops, plaintiffs’ conversion cause of action was improperly dismissed … . Van Amburgh v Boadle, 2024 NY Slip Op 04168, Third Dept 8-8-24

Practice Point: Here, although the land-lease for crop-growing included a mutual 90-day termination provision, the exercise of the termination provision must be harmonized with the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and the theory of emblements. Because defendants terminated the lease before plaintiffs could harvest the crops, the complaint stated causes of action for breach of contract and conversion.​

 

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