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You are here: Home1 / Civil Rights Law2 / DEFAMATORY STATEMENTS RELATING TO ISSUES OF BROAD PUBLIC INTEREST POSTED...
Civil Rights Law, Defamation

DEFAMATORY STATEMENTS RELATING TO ISSUES OF BROAD PUBLIC INTEREST POSTED ON FACEBOOK MAY BE ENCOMPASSED BY THE ANTI-SLAPP STATUTE; HERE, HOWEVER, THE STATEMENTS (ALLEGATIONS OF SEXUAL ABUSE) RELATED TO A PURELY PRIVATE MATTER AND, THEREFORE, WERE NOT ENCOMPASSED BY THE STATUTE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Love, determined (1) Facebook is a “public forum” within the meaning of the anti-SLAPP statute, and (2) the allegedly defamatory statements defendants posted on Facebook involved a “purely private matter,” not an issue of broad public interest, and therefore was not encompassed aby the anti-SLAPP statute. Therefore plaintiff’s defamation per se cause of action properly survived dismissal:

… [T]he defendants … posted a series of responses to a post on the personal Facebook page of the plaintiff … alleging that the plaintiff had sexually abused [one of the defendants] approximately 17 years prior when she was 4 years old … . * * *

Based upon the intent of the Legislature to redefine New York’s anti-SLAPP statute as broadly as possible, and the interpretation in decisions by other state courts of their similar state anti-SLAPP statutes defining Facebook and other social media applications as public forums, we conclude that Facebook is a public forum within the meaning of Civil Rights Law § 76-a(1). …

… [T]his action is not subject to the anti-SLAPP statute because the defendants’ statements published on the plaintiff’s Facebook page concerned “a purely private matter” … and were “directed only to a limited, private audience” … . Although the defendants made generic reference to issues of broad public interest, their primary focus was not an issue of broad public interest. Nelson v Ardrey, 2024 NY Slip Op 04147, Second Dept 8-7-24

Practice Point: Facebook is a “public forum” within the meaning of the anti-SLAPP statute.

Practice Point: Statements which relate to purely private matters, here Facebook posts alleging sexual abuse, as opposed to statements relating to a broad public interest, are not encompassed by the anti-SLAPP statute.

 

August 7, 2024
Tags: Second Department
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https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2024-08-07 10:09:012024-08-10 10:43:29DEFAMATORY STATEMENTS RELATING TO ISSUES OF BROAD PUBLIC INTEREST POSTED ON FACEBOOK MAY BE ENCOMPASSED BY THE ANTI-SLAPP STATUTE; HERE, HOWEVER, THE STATEMENTS (ALLEGATIONS OF SEXUAL ABUSE) RELATED TO A PURELY PRIVATE MATTER AND, THEREFORE, WERE NOT ENCOMPASSED BY THE STATUTE (SECOND DEPT).
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