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THE NEGOTIATED PLEA REQUIRED NO POST-PLEA ARRESTS; DEFENDANT WAS ARRESTED AFTER THE PLEA BUT THE PROCEEDINGS WERE DISMISSED ON SPEEDY TRIAL GROUNDS AND THE RECORDS SEALED; THE POST-PLEA ARRESTS WERE THEREFORE A NULLITY AND SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED BY THE SENTENCING JUDGE (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department determined defendant’s sentence was based upon post-plea arrests which resulted in dismissal on speedy trial grounds and for which the records had been sealed. Criminal records sealed pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) 160.50(1) have thereby been rendered a nullity. Therefore the sealed proceedings can not be the basis for a sentence:

… [T]he defendant … pleaded guilty to criminal possession of a firearm … and criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree …  as part of a negotiated disposition. It was agreed that if the defendant successfully completed one year of interim probation and complied with certain conditions during that time, including a no-arrest condition, the criminal possession of a firearm charge would be dismissed and he would be sentenced to a conditional discharge on the conviction of criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree. However, if the defendant failed to satisfy the conditions, he would be sentenced to a one-year term of imprisonment on the conviction of criminal possession of a firearm.

It is undisputed that during the term of the defendant’s interim probation, he was arrested three times. The proceedings with regard to those arrests were dismissed on speedy trial grounds and the records sealed. However, after an Outley hearing … , the Supreme Court determined that there was “a legitimate basis for [the defendant’s] arrest” and that the defendant failed to comply with the terms of his interim probation. Based upon that determination, the court sentenced the defendant to a one-year term of imprisonment on the conviction of criminal possession of a firearm. * * *

The proceedings resulting from the defendant’s postplea arrests were dismissed on speedy trial grounds, which were terminations in his favor … , and the records of those proceedings were sealed pursuant to CPL 160.50(1). Thus, the “arrest[s] and prosecution[s] [are] deemed a nullity” … , and the sealed records were “not available for consideration at sentencing” … . People v Desdunes, 2024 NY Slip Op 02932, Second Dept 5-29-24

Practice Point: Arrests and prosecutions dismissed on speedy trial grounds and sealed pursuant to CPL 160.50(1) are a nullity and cannot be considered in sentencing.

 

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