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THERE IS A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE SCHOOL’S DUTY TO SUPERVISE STUDENTS EXTENDS TO AN AREA OUTSIDE THE SCHOOL WHERE PARENTS PICK UP AND DROP OFF THE STUDENTS; INFANT PLAINTIFF TRIPPED AND FELL ON A ROAD DEFECT NEAR THE CURB (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the negligent supervision cause of action against defendant school should not have been dismissed. Infant plaintiff tripped and fell on a road defect that abutted a curb where students were picked up and dropped off by parents:

“Schools are under a duty to adequately supervise the students in their charge and they will be held liable for foreseeable injuries proximately related to the absence of adequate supervision” … . “Schools are not insurers of safety, however, for they cannot reasonably be expected to continuously supervise and control all movements and activities of students” … . “[A] school’s duty to supervise is generally viewed as being coextensive with and concomitant to its physical custody of and control over the child,” and therefore, “[w]hen that custody ceases because the child has passed out of the orbit of its authority in such a way that the parent is perfectly free to reassume control over the child’s protection, the school’s custodial duty also ceases” … . “[W]hile a school has no duty to prevent injury to schoolchildren released in a safe and anticipated manner, the school breaches a duty when it releases a child without further supervision into a foreseeably hazardous setting it had a hand in creating”… .

Under the circumstances of this case, the defendants failed to eliminate all triable issues of fact as to whether the infant plaintiff was released from school without adequate supervision into a foreseeably hazardous setting they had a hand in creating … . Thus, the defendants failed to establish, prima facie, that their negligent supervision over the infant plaintiff was not a proximate cause of the injuries the infant plaintiff sustained … . Levy v City of New York, 2024 NY Slip Op 02807, Second Dept 5-22-24

Practice Point: A school’s duty to supervise students may extend to areas outside the school, i.e., the area where students are picked up and dropped off by parents.

 

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