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SUPREME COURT DID NOT CITE ANY “EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES” TO JUSTIFY ITS SUA-SPONTE DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT IN THIS DIVORCE ACTION (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court in this divorce action, determined there was no demonstration of “extraordinary circumstances” to justify Supreme Court’s sua sponte dismissal of the complaint:

“A court’s power to dismiss a [complaint], sua sponte, is to be used sparingly, and only when extraordinary circumstances exist to warrant dismissal” … . Here, the Supreme Court did not identify any extraordinary circumstances warranting sua sponte dismissal of the complaint … . The plaintiff moved, inter alia, to consolidate custody and family offense proceedings that were pending in the Family Court, Queens County, and the Family Court, Kings County, with the instant action. There was no motion to dismiss the complaint in its entirety or to change venue before the court … . Ivashchenko v Borukhov, 2024 NY Slip Op 02526, Second Dept 5-8-24

Practice Point: This decision illustrates the appellate-courts’ discomfort with sua sponte dismissals of complaints (dismissal in the absence of a motion requesting it).

 

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