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Building With One Retail Unit and Two Apartments, One of Which Was Owner-Occupied, Did Not Qualify for the Homeowner’s Exemption from Liability Under the Labor Law

The Second Department determined defendant was not entitled to the homeowner’s exemption from liability under the Labor Law. The exemption is afforded owners of one and two-family residences who do not control the work on the premises. Here defendant’s building had a retail store on the ground level and two apartments above. One of the two apartments was occupied by the sole member of the defendant limited liability company which owned the building. The city had classified the building as within the “J-3” occupancy group, which includes one and two-family residential buildings. In finding the three-unit building did not trigger the exemption, the court explained the purpose behind the exemption, and the irrelevance of the “J-3” classification:

“In 1980, the Legislature amended Labor Law §§ 240 and 241 to exempt owners of one and two-family dwellings who contract for but do not direct or control the work’ from the absolute liability imposed by these statutory provisions” … . The homeowners’ exemption “was enacted to protect those people who, lacking business sophistication, would not know or anticipate the need to obtain insurance to cover them against the absolute liability imposed” by Labor Law §§ 240 and 241 … . The intent of the homeowner’s exemption was to make the law fairer and more reflective of the “practical realities governing the relationship between homeowners and the individuals they hire to perform construction work on their homes” … . The fact that title to an otherwise qualifying one- or two-family dwelling is held by a corporation rather than an individual homeowner does not, in and of itself, preclude application of the exemption … .

Here, [defendant] failed to make a prima facie showing that the subject building qualified as a two-family dwelling entitled to the protection of the homeowner’s exemption. Although [defendant] submitted evidence that the building’s certificate of occupancy classified it within the J-3 occupancy group that includes one- and two-family residential dwellings (see Administrative Code of the City of New York, § 27-266), this classification is not dispositive because it is primarily intended to govern what building code safety standards are applicable to the building … . Assevero v Hamilton & Church Props., LLC, 2015 NY Slip Op 06567, 2nd Dept 8-19-15

 

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