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TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR DEFAMATION THE COMPLAINT MUST ALLEGE THE ACTUAL WORDS, WHEN THE STATEMENTS WERE MADE AND TO WHOM THE STATEMENTS WERE MADE; ALLEGING THE “GENERAL CONTENT” OF THE STATEMENTS WITHOUT SPECIFYING WHEN AND TO WHOM THEY WERE MADE IS NOT ENOUGH (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the complaint in this defamation action was deficient in that the actual words alleged to have been defamatory, the dates the statements were made, and the persons to whom the statements were made were not described.

…[T]he complaint fails to state a viable defamation claim, since it does not set forth, inter alia, the actual words complained of, the dates of the alleged statements, or the persons to whom the statements were allegedly made. Rather, the complaint sets forth only the general content of the alleged defamatory statements, which were made at unspecified times to unnamed members of the community and unnamed persons at a business entity. Under such circumstances, the allegations failed to satisfy the pleading requirements of CPLR 3016(a) … . Sternberg v Wiederman, 2024 NY Slip Op 01576, Second Dept 3-20-24

Practice Point: A complaint sounding in defamation must allege the actual words, when the statements were made and to whom they were made. A description of the “general content” of the statements is not enough.

 

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