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QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER INJURY FROM A WOODEN CONCRETE FORM FALLING OVER WERE COVERED BY LABOR LAW 240(1) AND 241(6) (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined plaintiff raised questions of fact about whether injury caused by a 50-poind wooden concrete form falling over was covered by Labor Law 240(1) and 241(6):

… [P]laintiff raised triable issues of fact as to whether plaintiff’s injuries flowed directly from the application of the force of gravity to the form, whether the weight of the form could generate a significant amount of force as it fell and whether plaintiff’s injuries were proximately caused by the lack of a safety device of the kind required by the statute … . …

Plaintiff also raised triable issues as to his Labor Law § 241(6) claim predicated on Industrial Code (12 NYCRR) § 23-2.2(d), inasmuch as that section provides that stripped concrete forms “shall be promptly stockpiled or removed from areas in which persons are required to work or pass.” The evidence indicated … that the concrete forms were scattered about the garage area following concrete work performed in the garage two weeks earlier by plaintiff’s employer, the cement contractor. Lopez v 106 LPA LLC, 2023 NY Slip Op 06481, First Dept 12-19-23

Practice Point: Here a wooden form weighing 50 pounds, which was leaning against a wall, fell over on plaintiff. There were questions of fact whether this gravity-related event was covered by Labor Law 240(1), and whether violation of the Industrial Code provision requiring the stacking of concrete forms was covered by Labor Law 241(6).

 

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