You are here: / / IN A REAR-END COLLISION CASE, DEFENDANT’S ALLEGATION PLAINTIFF STOPPED...
,

IN A REAR-END COLLISION CASE, DEFENDANT’S ALLEGATION PLAINTIFF STOPPED SUDDENLY DOES NOT RAISE A QUESTION OF FACT (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment in this rear-end traffic accident cause should have been granted. Defendant’s allegation plaintiff stopped suddenly did not raise a question of fact:

It is well established that a rear-end collision with a slowing or stopping vehicle establishes a prima facie case of negligence on the part of the operator of the rear vehicle … .

… [D]efendant failed to provide a nonnegligent explanation for the accident … . Defendant failed to establish that she maintained a safe following distance (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1129[a] … ) and that any repeated braking by plaintiff was not foreseeable due to the existence of the construction zone and 15 mile per hour speed limit. Defendant failed to establish that given the circumstances she could have “reasonably expected that traffic would continue unimpeded” … . While defendant claims that plaintiff made a sudden stop, a “claim by the rear driver that the lead vehicle made a sudden stop, standing alone, is insufficient to rebut the presumption of negligence” … . Ahmad v Behal, 2023 NY Slip Op 06196, First Dept 11-30-23

Practice Point: In a rear-end collision case, alleging the car in front stopped suddenly does not defeat the presumption that the rear driver was negligent.

 

You might also like
STANDING ON AN INVERTED BUCKET CONSTITUTED A “PHYSICALLY SIGNIFICANT” HEIGHT-DIFFERENTIAL FOR PURPOSES OF LIABILITY UNDER LABOR LAW 240(1); INJURY WHILE PREVENTING A FALL IS COVERED BY LABOR LAW 240(1) (FIRST DEPT).
Where a Client’s Claims Against an Attorney Arise from the Attorney’s Providing Legal Services Which Are Related In Part to the Attorney’s Business Enterprise, the “Business Enterprise” Coverage Exclusions In the Legal Malpractice Insurance Policy Are Triggered
BAR AT ENTRANCE TO A SHOPPING-CART CORRAL WAS A TRIVIAL DEFECT.
Allegation in Notice of Claim that Defendant Failed to Maintain a Stairway Was Sufficient to Encompass the Allegation the Handrail Was Obstructed and Could Not Be Used
THE JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE CONSIDERED WHETHER THE INVOICES FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES WERE “REASONABLE;” THE ONLY QUESTION IN AN ACCOUNT-STATED ACTION IS WHETHER THE CLIENT OBJECTED TO THE AMOUNTS OF THE INVOICES (FIRST DEPT).
Allegation of “But For” Element of Attorney Malpractice Too Speculative
OUT-OF-POSSESSION LANDLORD CAN BE LIABLE UNDER LABOR LAW 240 AND 241.
PLAINTIFFS’ LEGAL MALPRACTICE ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED; PLAINTIFFS’ 2010 BREACH OF A CONDOMINIUM-SALE CONTRACT ACTION WAS DISMISSED ON STATUTE OF FRAUDS GROUNDS; WHEN A WRITTEN CONTRACT SUBSEQUENTLY SURFACED, DEFENDANT ATTORNEYS DID NOT MOVE TO RENEW, VACATE OR APPEAL THE ORDER (FIRST DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

THE RIGHT TO SEEK REMOVAL OF A CLOUD ON TITLE IS NEVER BARRED BY A STATUTE OF... AN ESCAPE LADDER BOLTED TO THE CEILING OF A PERSONNEL HOIST DETACHED AND FELL...