Count (on which Jury Could Not Reach a Verdict) Dismissed Before “Entry of Sentence” on the Remaining Count Can Be Reprosecuted after Appeal
The First Department determined the defendant could be retried on an attempted rape charge which was dismissed upon a motion by the prosecution after the jury was unable to reach a verdict on that count. The defendant was convicted of the assault count. The assault conviction was reversed on appeal and a new trial was ordered. The question before the court was whether, upon re-trial, the dismissed attempted rape count could be re-tried as well:
Upon remand, Supreme Court properly determined that the People were permitted to reprosecute the attempted rape charge, because that count of the indictment was deemed reinstated pursuant to CPL 470.55(1). Although the statute provides that a count is not deemed reinstated if it was dismissed on a “post-judgment order” (CPL 470.55[b]), the dismissal of the attempted rape charge occurred between the oral imposition of sentence and the entry of judgment … . There is nothing in the record to indicate that, before dismissing the count at issue, the court had done anything that could be construed as entry of a judgment. Since a judgment “is comprised of a conviction and the sentence imposed thereon and is completed by imposition and entry of the sentence” (CPL 1.20 [emphasis added]), “post-judgment” can only mean after entry.
Double jeopardy concerns did not bar retrying defendant on the attempted rape count. The first jury never returned any verdict on that count. Furthermore, defendant had no legitimate expectation that the dismissal of that count was final and irrevocable As noted, the statute provides that a reversal granting a new trial would automatically reinstate any counts dismissed under the circumstances presented here. Moreover, the record establishes that when the People moved to dismiss, they were engaging in the common practice of dismissing a charge as sufficiently covered by a conviction on another charge, an exercise of prosecutorial discretion that was frustrated by the reversal of the conviction. Defendant had no legitimate expectation that in the event of a reversal he would receive the windfall of having the dismissed charge stay dismissed. People v Thomas, 2013 NY Slip Op 07833, 1st Dept 11-26-13