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PLAINTIFF DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE RELEASE WAS PROCURED BY FRAUD, CRITERIA EXPLAINED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined plaintiff did not demonstrate the release plaintiff agreed to was procured by fraud. Therefore the motion to dismiss the causes of action covered by the release should have been granted:

“Generally, a valid release constitutes a complete bar to an action on a claim which is the subject of the release” … . “If the language of a release is clear and unambiguous, the signing of a release is a jural act binding on the parties” … . “Notably, a release may encompass unknown claims, including unknown fraud claims, if the parties so intend and the agreement is fairly and knowingly made” … .

“A release should never be converted into a starting point for . . . litigation except under circumstances and under rules which would render any other result a grave injustice” … . “A release may be invalidated, however, for any of the traditional bases for setting aside written agreements, namely, duress, illegality, fraud, or mutual mistake” … . “Although a defendant has the initial burden of establishing that it has been released from any claims, a signed release shifts the burden of going forward . . . to the [plaintiff] to show that there has been fraud, duress or some other fact which will be sufficient to void the release” …  “A plaintiff seeking to invalidate a release due to fraudulent inducement must establish the basic elements of fraud, namely a representation of material fact, the falsity of that representation, knowledge by the party who made the representation that it was false when made, justifiable reliance by the plaintiff, and resulting injury” … . “[A] party that releases a fraud claim may later challenge that release as fraudulently induced only if it can identify a separate fraud from the subject of the release” … . JM UC Group, LLC v Precious Care Mgt., LLC, 2023 NY Slip Op 06034, Second Dept 11-22-23

Practice Point: The decision includes the text of a detailed release which is worth reading. A release can even cover unknown claims, even unknown fraud claims. Here plaintiff did not demonstrate the release was procured by fraud and the relevant causes of action should have been dismissed.

 

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THE 90-DAY TIME-LIMIT IN RPAPL 1371 FOR BRINGING A MOTION FOR A DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT... THERE WAS A SURPLUS AFTER THE FORECLOSURE SALE OF DEFENDANT’S PROPERTY;...