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IN A REAR-END COLLISION CASE, THE ALLEGATION THAT PLAINTIFF STOPPED SUDDENLY IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO DEFEAT PLAINTIFF’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant in this rear-end collision case did not raise a question of fact by alleging plaintiff stopped suddenly:

… [P]laintiff established his prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of liability by averring that he had activated his right turn signal, had slowed to a speed of approximately five miles per hour, and was attempting to make a right turn when his vehicle was struck in the rear by the defendants’ vehicle … .

In opposition, the defendants submitted an affidavit of the defendant driver in which he averred that the plaintiff’s vehicle stopped short suddenly, causing the defendants’ vehicle to collide with the plaintiff’s vehicle. The defendants’ assertion that it was the sudden stop of the plaintiff’s vehicle which caused the accident was insufficient, in and of itself, to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether there was a nonnegligent explanation for the happening of the rear-end collision … . Gil v Manhattan Beer Distribs., LLC, 2022 NY Slip Op 04537, Second Dept 7-13-22

Practice Point: The defendant in a rear-end collision case does not raise a question of fact about a non-negligent explanation for the accident by alleging plaintiff stopped suddenly.

 

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