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THE JUDGE GRANTED FATHER’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS (ATTORNEY’S FEES) WITHOUT AFFORDING MOTHER AN OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD; THE JUDGE RULED ON FATHER’S MOTION AFTER DECIDING TO GRANT MOTHER’S MOTION FOR RECUSAL; REVERSED (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing Family Court in this custody proceeding, determined the judge should not have awarded attorneys fees to father as sanctions for mother’s actions without affording mother an opportunity to be heard. In addition, the judge should not have ruled on  father’s motion for sanctions after deciding to grant mother’s motion for recusal:

… [T]he mother contends that the Family Court improvidently exercised its discretion in awarding the father reasonable attorneys’ fees without affording her a reasonable opportunity to be heard. We agree. Notably, the court never set a briefing schedule for the sanctions motion, and the court, in effect, denied the mother’s new counsel’s request to file opposition papers thereto. Under these circumstances, the mother did not receive a “reasonable opportunity to be heard” on the allegations in the sanctions motion … .

Additionally, the Family Court improvidently exercised its discretion by deciding the sanctions motion after indicating to the parties … that it intended to grant the mother’s motion for recusal. Matter of Hunte v Jones, 2023 NY Slip Op 05731, Second Dept 11-15-23

Practice Point: Here, after deciding to grant mother’s motion for recusal, the judge granted father’s motion for sanctions (attorney’s fees) without affording mother an opportunity to be heard. Reversed.

 

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