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DEFENDANT STRUCK THE REAR OF PLAINTIFF’S STOPPED VEHICLE; DEFENDANT’S CLAIM THAT HIS FOOT SLIPPED OFF THE BRAKE PEDAL DID NOT PRESENT A NONEGLIGENT EXPLANATION OR TRIGGER THE EMERGENCY DOCTRINE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff in this rear-end collision case was entitled to summary judgment. Defendant’s allegation his foot slipped off the brake pedal because of rocks and pebbles under the floor mat did not present a nonnegligent explanation for striking plaintiff’s stopped vehicle:

[Defendant’s] assertion that he tried to apply the brakes on his vehicle to avoid a collision with the plaintiff’s vehicle, but his foot slipped off the brake pedal due to rocks and pebbles under the floor mat, was insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact as to as to whether there was a nonnegligent explanation for the happening of the accident, or whether the emergency doctrine applied … . Donnellan v LaMarche, 2023 NY Slip Op 05713, Second Dept 11-15-23

Practice Point: Here defendant struck the rear of plaintiff’s stopped vehicle. Defendant’s explanation that his foot slipped off the brake pedal was not enough to raise a question of fact about either a nonnegligent explanation or the applicability of the emergency doctrine.

 

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