You are here: / / THE TRIPPING HAZARD IN A WALKWAY VIOLATED THE INDUSTRIAL CODE; PLAINTIFF...

THE TRIPPING HAZARD IN A WALKWAY VIOLATED THE INDUSTRIAL CODE; PLAINTIFF ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE LABOR LAW 241(6) CAUSE OF ACTION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment on the Labor Law 241(6) cause of action. Plaintiff tripped on a bowed piece of Masonite that was in a walkway, a violation of the Industrial Code:

Labor Law § 241(6) imposes a nondelegable duty upon owners and contractors to provide reasonable and adequate protection and safety to workers by complying with specific safety rules and regulations set out in the Industrial Code (12 NYCRR) … . “To succeed on a cause of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 241(6), a plaintiff must demonstrate that his or her injuries were proximately caused by a violation of an Industrial Code provision that is applicable under the circumstances of the accident” … . The plaintiff here relies upon 12 NYCRR 23-1.7(e)(1), which provides, in pertinent part, that “[a]ll passageways shall be kept free from accumulations of dirt and debris and from any other obstructions or conditions which could cause tripping.”

The plaintiff demonstrated his prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of liability on the cause of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 241(6) by tendering evidence establishing that while performing construction work, he fell over a tripping hazard in a passageway … , in the form of a raised or bowed piece of Masonite board, and that this unsafe condition was the proximate cause of his injuries … . Tompkins v Turner Constr. Co., 2023 NY Slip Op 05631, Second Dept 11-8-23

Practice Point: Where the proximate cause of plaintiff’s injury is a condition which violates the Industrial Code, here a tripping hazard in a walkway, the plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment on a Labor Law 241(6) cause of action.

 

You might also like
FATHER’S FAILURE TO APPEAR DID NOT JUSTIFY FAMILY COURT’S AWARD OF CUSTODY TO MOTHER WITHOUT HOLDING A HEARING (SECOND DEPT). ​
Primary Assumption of Risk Jury Charge Required Reversal.
MOTION TO VACATE DEFAULT JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, PLAINTIFF’S ATTORNEY’S ILLNESS WAS A REASONABLE EXCUSE FOR FAILURE TO APPEAR AT ORAL ARGUMENT, MERITORIOUS ACTION DEMONSTRATED, FIRST MOTION DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE, SECOND MOTION ON THE SAME GROUNDS WAS NOT, THEREFORE, PRECLUDED (SECOND DEPT).
PLAINTIFF’S PARKED VEHICLE WAS STRUCK FROM BEHIND BY DEFENDANT; PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON LIABILITY; THE FACT THAT PLAINTIFF MAY HAVE VIOLATED TRAFFIC RULES RE: PARKING SPEAKS TO COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE WHICH IS NOT RELEVANT TO LIABILITY (SECOND DEPT).
RESPONDENT MATERNAL UNCLE IN THIS CUSTODY PROCEEDING DID NOT EFFECTIVELY WAIVE HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL; ORDER REVERSED (SECOND DEPT).
DEFENDANT PRESENTED EVIDENCE HE WOULD NOT HAVE PLED GUILTY HAD HE KNOWN HIS FEDERAL AND STATE SENTENCES WOULD NOT RUN CONCURRENTLY, MOTION TO VACATE CONVICTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DENIED WITHOUT A HEARING (SECOND DEPT).
Waiver of a Jury Trial in an Article 10 Sex-Offender Civil Commitment Proceeding Requires an On-the-Record Colloquy After Consultation with Counsel
PLAINTIFF ENTITLED TO WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION UNDER LABOR LAW 741.

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

DEFENDANT WAS MISNAMED IN THE COMPLAINT BUT WAS TIMELY SERVED; THE AMENDED COMPLAINT... PLAINTIFF RAISED QUESTIONS OF FACT ABOUT THE EXISTENCE OF AN AGREEMENT WITH...