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Entering the Victim’s Domicile With the Intent to Assault the Victim Who Died from His Injuries Constitutes Felony Murder (Murder Committed During a Burglary)

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Abdus-Salaam, determined defendant’s felony murder conviction should stand. There was evidence the defendant entered the victim’s apartment intending to assault, not kill, the victim. Therefore the defendant’s causing the death of the victim in the course of the burglary constituted felony murder. The question whether entering the apartment with the intent to kill, and thereafter killing the victim, would also constitute felony murder remains unanswered. The court rejected defendant’s argument that the felony murder statute requires that the death be caused in order to advance the underlying felony, finding that the statute requires only a logical nexus between a murder and a felony:

Noting the Legislature’s inclusion of burglary of all degrees, without qualification, as a predicate felony for felony murder, we observed “that persons within domiciles are in greater peril from those entering the domicile with criminal intent, than persons on the street who are being subjected to the same criminal intent. Thus, the burglary statutes prescribe greater punishment for a criminal act committed within the domicile than for the same act committed on the street” … . It is clear that the Legislature chose to treat burglary differently than other crimes. Therefore, an individual who approaches another on the street with an intent to assault but causes the death of that person could be convicted of manslaughter, but not felony murder. It is entirely reasonable, however, that a person — like defendant — who unlawfully enters a building with the intent to commit an assault therein, but causes the death of another, may be convicted of felony murder, in recognition that the homicide occurs in the context of other criminal activity that enhances the seriousness of the offense. * * *

Defendant also argues that his felony murder conviction rests on legally insufficient evidence because there is no evidence that he committed the murder “in the furtherance of” a burglary. He asserts that the statutory language “in the furtherance of” requires that the death be caused in order to advance or promote the underlying felony. We have not interpreted “in the furtherance of” so narrowly. The felony murder statute is intended to punish a perpetrator for a death he or she caused during the commission of a felony, but not a death that is coincidental to the felony … . The “in furtherance of” element requires “a logical nexus between a murder and a felony” … . Here, there is a clear logical nexus between defendant’s felony of unlawfully entering the victim’s apartment to assault him and the homicide, which was certainly not coincidental. People v Henderson, 2015 NY Slip Op 05592, CtApp 6-30-15

 

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