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THE DISPUTE BETWEEN TWO RELIGIOUS ENTITIES COULD NOT BE RESOLVED ON THE BASIS OF NEUTRAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW; THEREFORE COURTS ARE PROHIBITED FROM ADJUDICATING THE MATTER BY THE FIRST AMENDMENT (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the dispute between plaintiff church and defendant, which has some form of supervisory authority over plaintiff church, could not be adjudicated in a court pursuant to the First Amendment:

“The First Amendment forbids civil courts from interfering in or determining religious disputes, because there is substantial danger that the state will become entangled in essentially religious controversies or intervene on behalf of groups espousing particular doctrines or beliefs . . . Civil disputes involving religious parties or institutions may be adjudicated without offending the First Amendment as long as neutral principles of law are the basis for their resolution” … .

We conclude that none of the relief requested by plaintiff in its complaint may be decided by a court based on neutral principles of law … . Instead, resolution of those issues would “necessarily involve an impermissible inquiry into religious doctrine or practice” … . United Church of Friendship v New York Dist. of Assemblies of God, 2023 NY Slip Op 05090, Fourth Dept 10-6-23

Practice Point: Where the resolution of a dispute between religious entities requires a court to inquire into religious doctrine or practice, the First Amendment prohibits court involvement.

 

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