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PLAINTIFF’S PARKED VEHICLE WAS STRUCK FROM BEHIND BY DEFENDANT; PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON LIABILITY; THE FACT THAT PLAINTIFF MAY HAVE VIOLATED TRAFFIC RULES RE: PARKING SPEAKS TO COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE WHICH IS NOT RELEVANT TO LIABILITY (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment in this traffic accident case should have been granted. Plaintiff’s car was parked when it was struck from behind by defendant. The fact that plaintiff may have parked in a manner which violated the NYC traffic rules speaks only to plaintiff’s comparative negligence, which is not relevant at the summary judgment stage:

… [P]laintiff established her prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of liability through the submission of her affidavit, in which she averred that her vehicle was struck in the rear by the defendants’ vehicle while the plaintiff’s vehicle was parked on the shoulder of the roadway (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1129[a] …). In opposition to the plaintiff’s prima facie showing, the defendants failed to rebut the inference of negligence by providing a nonnegligent explanation for the collision … . The defendants’ contention that the plaintiff proximately caused the accident by violating 34 RCNY 4-07(b)(1) and 4-08(e)(1) [NYC Traffic Rules re: parking] speaks to her comparative negligence, which was not the subject of this motion and is insufficient to defeat the plaintiff’s prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of liability … . Whaley v Carvana N.Y. City, 2023 NY Slip Op 04794, Second Dept 9-27-23

Practice Point: Plaintiff’s parked car was struck from behind and defendant did not offer a nonnegligent explanation for the collision. Therefore plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment on liability. The fact that plaintiff may have violated parking rules speaks to comparative negligence and is not relevant to liability.

 

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